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FEIGNED CONSENSUS: 
USURPING THE LAW IN SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME/ 
ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA PROSECUTIONS 
KEITH A. FINDLEY,* D. MICHAEL RISINGER,** PATRICK D. 
BARNES,*** JULIE A. MACK,**** DAVID A. MORAN,***** BARRY C. 
SCHECK,****** 
AND THOMAS L. BOHAN******* 
Few medico-legal matters have generated as much controversy—both 
in the medical literature and in the courtroom—as Shaken Baby Syndrome 
(SBS), now known more broadly as Abusive Head Trauma (AHT). The 
controversies are of enormous significance in the law because child abuse 
pediatricians claim, on the basis of a few non-specific medical findings 
supported by a weak and methodologically flawed research base, to be able 
to “diagnose” child abuse, and thereby to provide all of the evidence 
necessary to satisfy all of the legal elements for criminal prosecution (or 
removal of children from their parents). It is a matter, therefore, in which 
medical opinion claims to fully occupy the legal field. As controversies 
flare up increasingly in the legal arena, child abuse pediatricians and 
prosecutors now respond by claiming both that there is actually no real 
controversy about SBS/AHT, and that it is a purely medical “diagnosis” 
and not a legal conclusion, so testimony in support of the SBS hypothesis 
should not be challenged in court. This article, coauthored by four law 
professors, two physicians, and a physicist, demonstrates that there is very 
much a live controversy about the SBS/AHT hypothesis and maintains that, 
under traditional principles of evidence law, physicians should not be 
permitted to “diagnose” abuse in court (as opposed to identifying specific 
symptoms or medical findings). 
Introduction ................................................................. 1212 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School; Co-Founder 
and President, Center on Integrity in Forensic Science; Co-Founder, Wisconsin 
Innocence Project. 
** John J. Gibbons Professor of Law Emeritus, Seton Hall University School of 
Law; Associate Director, Last Resort Exoneration Project. 
*** M.D., Professor of Radiology, Emeritus—Pediatric Radiology & 
Neuroradiology, Lucile Packard Children's Hospital at Stanford, Stanford University 
Medical Center. 
**** M.D., Assistant Professor of Radiology, Pennsylvania State University 
Medical Center. 
***** Clinical Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; Co-
Founder and Director, Michigan Innocence Clinic. 
****** Professor of Law, Cardozo Law School; Co-Founder & Co-Director, 
Innocence Project. 
******* Ph.D. (physics), Past President, American Academy of Forensic 
Sciences (2009–2010); Past President, Forensic Specialties Accreditation Board (2015–
17); Director (retired), MTC Forensics (1982–2013). 
1212 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
I. Is SBS/AHT Controversial? ............................................ 1216 
A. Controversy in the Medical Literature ...................... 1217 
B. Controversy in the Biomechanical and Scientific
Literature ....................................................... 1220 
C. Uncertainty about SBS Mechanisms and Conclusions .... 1222 
D. Controversy in the Face of Claimed Consensus ........... 1225 
E. Broad Claims, Nuanced Controversies ...................... 1231 
F. Recognizing Controversy: Independent Scientific
Reviews ........................................................ 1232 
G. Judicial Recognitions of the Shifting Science and
Attendant Controversy ....................................... 1234 
II. Is AHT a “Medical Diagnosis” or a “Legal Conclusion”? ....... 1236 
A. The SPR’s Claims .............................................. 1236 
B. Foundational Question—Is the Conclusion of SBS/AHT
Even a “Diagnosis” as that Term is Used in Medicine? 1238
C. The Legal Essence of the “Diagnosis” ...................... 1246 
III. Implications of the Controversies and Legal Nature of the
SBS/AHT Conclusions ............................................ 1254 
A. The Significance of the Legal Nature of the SBS/AHT
Conclusion ..................................................... 1254 
1. The Limitations of Medical Expertise in a Legal
Context ..................................................... 1254 
2. Admissibility Issues Arising from the Legal Nature
of the “Diagnosis” ........................................ 1258 
B. Legal Implications of the Controversy ...................... 1261 
Conclusion ................................................................... 1262 
INTRODUCTION 
Few medico-legal matters have generated as much controversy—
both in the medical literature and in the courtroom—as Shaken Baby 
Syndrome (SBS), now known more broadly, at the urging of the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, as Abusive Head Trauma (AHT).1 
The medical and legal literature is replete with research and opinion 
pieces debating all aspects of the hypothesis;2 entire sessions at medical 
and legal conferences are devoted to examining the disputed issues and 
1. Cindy W. Christian, Robert Block, & the Committee on Child Abuse and
Neglect, Abusive Head Trauma in Infants and Children, 123 PEDIATRICS 1409, 1410 
(2009) (“[T]he American Academy of Pediatrics recommends adoption of the term 
‘abusive head trauma’ as the diagnosis used in the medical chart to describe the 
constellation of cerebral, spinal, and cranial injuries that result from inflicted head 
injury to infants and young children.”).  
2.  See infra notes 22–29 and accompanying text.
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strategizing ways to defeat the other side in these debates;3 and growing 
numbers of courts are recognizing the controversies and overturning 
convictions on the basis of the expanding uncertainties related to 
medical opinion purporting to diagnose abuse.4 
3. See, e.g., Keith A. Findley et al., Shaken Baby Syndrome, Abusive Head 
Trauma, and Actual Innocence: Getting It Right, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 209, 
241 (2012) (observing that the National Association of Medical Examiners conference 
in 2006 “included presentations entitled ‘Use of the Triad of Scant Subdural 
Hemorrhage, Brain Swelling, and Retinal Hemorrhages to Diagnose Non-Accidental 
Injury is Not Scientifically Valid’ and ‘“Where’s the Shaking?”’ Dragons, Elves, the 
Shaking Baby Syndrome and Other Mythical Entities.’”); Robert M. Reece et al., The 
Evidence Base for Shaken Baby Syndrome: Response to Editorial from 106 Doctors, 
328 BRIT. MED. J. 1316, 1316–17 (2004); Brian Holmgren, Assistant District Attorney 
General, Keynote Address at Eleventh International Conference on Shaken Baby 
Syndrome/Abusive Head Trauma: To Tell the Truth – Examining Defense Witness 
Testimony in Abusive Head Trauma Cases (Sept. 13, 2010), 
https://www.dontshake.org/media/k2/attachments/2010-AtlantaProgram.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YDQ7-96CC] (presentation notes and lyrics on file with authors). 
4. See, e.g., People v. Ackley, 870 N.W.2d 858 (Mich. 2015) (finding 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present medical evidence disputing the 
prosecution experts’ SBS/AHT-based opinions); People v. Bailey, 999 N.Y.S.2d 713, 724 
(N.Y.S. Cnty. Ct. 2014) (finding newly discovered evidence of emerging medical research 
challenging the SBS/AHT diagnosis); People v. Baumer, No. 267373, 2007 WL 1095236, 
at *1, *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2007) (discussing ineffective assistance of 
counsel), motion for immediate consideration granted, 781 N.W.2d 309 (Mich. 2010); Ex 
Parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d 458, 469–70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (finding ineffective 
assistance of counsel); Armando Castillo: Actual Innocence – Invalid Science – 
Conviction Vacated, AZ JUST. PROJECT (May 21, 2015), https://
www.azjusticeproject.org/manifest-injustice-profiles/armando-castillo 
[https://perma.cc/9VH9-HYH9] (discussing the judge’s conclusion of ineffective 
assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence); Brafford v. State, No. PC-2014-803 
(Okla. Crim. App. March 26, 2019) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel and newly 
discovered evidence warranted new trial); Brown v. State, 152 So.3d 1146, 1169 (Miss. 2014) 
(concluding that the trial court erroneously denied funds for defense to hire experts to 
challenge state’s expert medical evidence); People v. Dimambro, 897 N.W.2d 233 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2016); Barry Siegel, Judging Parents as Murderers on 4 Specks of 
Blood, L.A. TIMES (July 11, 1999), http://
articles.latimes.com/1999/jul/11/news/mn-54984 [https://perma.cc/5WCV-J9LK] (discussing 
newly discovered evidence); Commonwealth v. Epps, 53 N.E.3d 1247, 1266 (Mass. 
2016) (discussing ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence); In re 
Pers. Restraint of Fero, 367 P.3d 588, 600 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (discussing newly 
discovered medical evidence), rev’d, 409 P.3d 214, 226 (Wash. 2018); State v. Hales, 
152 P.3d 321, 325 (Utah 2007) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel); Ex Parte 
Henderson, 384 S.W.3d 833, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (noting the effect of newly 
discovered medical evidence); Order on Defendant’s Motion to Disallow the Introduction 
of Testimony Regarding Shaken Baby Syndrome, State v. Hyatt, No. 06M7-CR00016-02 
(Cir. Ct. Shelby Cty. Nov. 2007) (discussing newly discovered medical evidence); Isham 
v. State, 161 So.3d 1076, 1077 (Miss. 2015) (holding that the defendant was entitled 
to a publicly funded expert to refute the prosecution's SBS/AHT scientific evidence); 
Maurice Possley, Joel Lehmer, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS 
(July 29, 2012), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/
Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3953 
[https://perma.cc/8FE4-DQT9] (concluding that newly discovered medical evidence 
1214 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
Increasingly, proponents of the SBS/AHT “diagnosis” have 
attempted to take the debate away from the courts through efforts to 
delegitimize those who criticize or challenge some aspects of the 
SBS/AHT hypothesis. Instead of encouraging full airing of scientific 
debate—a hallmark of true scientific inquiry—SBS/AHT-hypothesis 
proponents have sought to silence debate and dissent by demeaning 
physicians who break ranks,5 attempting to strip the critics of their 
medical licenses and society memberships6 or jobs,7 attempting to bar 
warranted vacating the convictions); Joseph Shapiro, Free, but Not Cleared: Ernie 
Lopez Comes Home, NPR (Mar. 5, 2012, 4:06 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2012/03/05/147969316/free-but-not-cleared-ernie-lopez-comes-
home [https://perma.cc/NM2H-SBWY] (discussing ineffective assistance of counsel 
and newly discovered medical evidence); Kenneth Marsh, CALIFORNIA INNOCENCE
PROJECT, https://californiainnocenceproject.org/read-their-stories/kenneth-marsh/ 
[https://perma.cc/754S-6HAL] (discussing the dismissal of charges in light of newly 
discovered evidence); Commonwealth v. Millien, 50 N.E.3d 808, 809 (Mass. 2016) 
(concluding ineffective assistance of counsel); Alexandra Gross, John Peel, NAT’L
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3813 
[https://perma.cc/VSV8-3XX3] (reversing defendant’s convictions in light of newly 
discovered evidence); State v. Schoonmaker, 176 P.3d 1105, 1108 (N.M. 2008) 
(reversing defendant’s convictions on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel); 
State v. Weaver, 554 N.W.2d 240, 250 (Iowa 1996) (holding that the lower court did 
not unreasonably conclude that newly discovered evidence probably would change the 
result at trial). Still other courts have also granted relief under the more difficult 
standards requiring a petitioner to establish actual innocence.  See, e.g., Del Prete v. 
Thompson, 10 F. Supp. 3d 907, 909 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (holding that medical evidence 
challenging the state’s SBS/AHT-based opinions established the petitioner’s “actual 
innocence” sufficiently to permit her to proceed on otherwise defaulted claims); Robins 
v. State, 385 P.3d 57 (Nev. 2016) (holding that, in part, new medical evidence
established defendant’s actual innocence claim, permitting defendant to proceed on
otherwise defaulted claims).
5.  See Findley et al., supra note 3, at 226–27 and notes 54–55 (describing
how Dr. Christopher Greeley, Assoc. Professor of Pediatrics, Univ. of Tex. Health 
Sci. Ctr. at Houston, while presenting at New York City Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken 
Baby Syndrome Training Conference in 2011, suggested that researchers who question 
SBS/AHT theory use “sleaze tactics” and may have “histrionic/borderline” personality 
disorders; also noting that high-profile SBS/AHT prosecutor Brian Holmgren, who 
presented the Keynote Address at the Eleventh International Conference on Shaken 
Baby Syndrome/Abusive Head Trauma: To Tell the Truth—Examining Defense 
Witness Testimony in Abusive Head Trauma Cases, showed excerpts of testimony from 
defense experts juxtaposed with an image of Pinocchio with a growing nose, concluding 
with a sing-along to the tune of “If I only had a brain” led by a prominent child abuse 
pediatrician, joined by prosecutors and doctors, mocking those who propose diagnostic 
alternatives to SBS/AHT).  
6.  See, e.g., Peter J. Strouse, Child Abuse: We Have Problems, 46 
PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 587, 588 (2016) (disparaging SBS/AHT “denialists” as 
“deceitful and unethical” and arguing that “[l]icensing bureaus could have a role by 
limiting practice” and that professional societies “should question condoning the 
activities of denialists by allowing them to continue membership and to continue to use 
society membership as evidence of expertise”).
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them from the courtroom,8 and even prosecuting them criminally for 
their expert testimony on behalf of criminal defendants.9 
Recently, these efforts have taken the form of denying that there is 
any debate at all about the reliability of SBS and AHT determinations. 
A recent very pointed example of that strategy, published as a so-called 
“consensus” statement by the Society for Pediatric Radiology (SPR),10 
prompts us, as legal, medical, and science scholars, to respond. 
While the particular article that motivates this response was 
published in a medical journal—Pediatric Radiology—we respond in a 
law journal because the SPR statement was written primarily for a legal 
audience—specifically, to influence judges in the way they handle 
conflicting expert opinions in SBS/AHT cases and to equip prosecutors 
to overcome defense challenges. Indeed, the statement directly 
addresses the legal system, with major section headings such as, “[t]he 
issues that perpetuate misconceptions in the courtroom,”11 and, “[w]hat 
can be done to provide the court accurate information about the state of 
medical knowledge in AHT,”12 along with subheadings such as, “[t]he 
admissibility of expert evidence,”13 and the like. And the text speaks 
directly to the courts, asserting, for example, that “[c]ourts should 
assume that a consensus statement reflects general physician acceptance 
of a particular precept,”14 and that, “[e]xperts, through consensus 
7.  See id. (“Institutions that harbor denialists, whether they be private
practices or esteemed academic institutions, should carefully consider their 
employment.”). 
8. See, e.g., Doctor Wins Appeal Over Shaken Baby Syndrome Trials
Evidence, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/nov/04/doctor-waney-squier-wins-appeal-
shaken-baby-syndrome-trials-evidence [https://perma.cc/WG5W-7VVZ] (describing 
efforts to revoke Dr. Waney Squier’s medical license and ban her from testifying in 
child abuse cases); Mark Hansen, Battle of the Expert, A.B.A.J. (Dec. 29, 2005, 11:29 
AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/battle_of_the_expert
[https://perma.cc/4CU3-9EG6] (describing a complaint filed with the Minnesota Board 
of Medical Practice in 1999 against Dr. John Plunkett after he testified on behalf of a 
baby sitter who was subsequently acquitted on charges of violently shaking a fourteen-
month-old boy; the complaint against Plunkett was ultimately dismissed). 
9.  See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 8 (describing perjury charges brought
against Dr. John Plunkett in Oregon for his testimony in an SBS case—charges on 
which he was acquitted after a trial); Radley Balko, Dr. John Plunkett, RIP. He Told 
the Truth About Bad Forensics—and was Prosecuted for It, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 
2017, 1:13 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2018/04/10/dr-
john-plunkett-rip-he-told-the-truth-about-bad-forensics-and-was-prosecuted-for-
it/?utm_term=.99c825a28f81 (same). 
10. Arabinda Kumar Choudhary et al., Consensus Statement on Abusive Head
Trauma in Infants and Young Children, 48 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 1048 (2018). 
11.  Id. at 1057.
12.  Id. at 1058.
13.  Id.
14.  Id.
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statements, can also help courts identify the medical evidence that 
reflects scientific knowledge because it is supported by the evidence 
and has been generally accepted in the relevant field of pediatric 
medicine.”15 This, the SPR asserts, will “assist courts in identifying 
testimonial parameters for expert testimony and help judges and juries 
delineate evidence-based medical knowledge from fringe, speculative, 
or professionally irresponsible opinions.”16 To sum it up, the statement 
concludes that “[t]he professional societies’ consensus statement on 
AHT should help the court recognize unsubstantiated medical expert 
testimony.”17 
Our response focuses on three points. First, we address the SPR’s 
contention that there is in fact no dispute about SBS/AHT, and 
therefore no reason for courts and juries to be distracted by dissenting 
expert opinions. Second, we address the SPR’s claim that SBS/AHT is 
purely a “medical diagnosis” and not at all a legal conclusion. Third, 
we address the clear implication in the SPR statement that, given the 
“general acceptance” purportedly represented by the consensus 
statement and the absolute absence of any real debate, the courts should 
defer entirely to the SPR and like-minded physicians’ groups rather 
than making independent judicial inquiry into the reliability of proffered 
expert testimony. Under this last point, we address two implicit sub-
points from the SPR statement: (1) that courts should accordingly admit 
prosecution-proffered testimony, but not defense-proffered contrary 
testimony, about SBS/AHT; and (2) that courts should stop drawing the 
legal conclusion that emerging controversies and shifts in medical 
understandings about SBS/AHT provide a basis for granting 
postconviction relief in cases where convictions were obtained without 
benefit of the now-growing body of contradictory medical and 
biomechanical science. 
I. IS SBS/AHT CONTROVERSIAL?
In the debates about the reliability of the “diagnosis” of SBS/AHT, 
the recent tack by child abuse pediatricians is to deny that the debate 
exists—to deny there is any controversy at all.18 That approach is 
15.  Id.
16.  Id.
17.  Id. at 1060.
18.  Alternatively, child abuse pediatricians recognize the controversy but
argue that it should be ignored because it can impede their ability to diagnose abuse. As 
Dr. Robert Block wrote in 1999: “Although controversy may spark scientific inquiry, it 
can interfere with proper recognition and management. When one cares for children 
who have been shaken, with or without impact, the controversy has no place in the 
diagnosis of abuse, which has obviously occurred in either case.” Robert W. Block, 
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apparent in the new SPR statement. The statement asserts, for example, 
that “[t]here is no controversy concerning the medical validity of the 
existence of AHT, with multiple components including subdural 
hematoma, intracranial and spinal changes, complex retinal 
hemorrhages, and rib and other fractures that are inconsistent with the 
provided mechanism of trauma.”19 Later, the statement goes a step 
further, asserting, “AHT is a scientifically non-controversial medical 
diagnosis broadly recognized and managed throughout the world.”20 
According to the SPR, the purported controversy reflects merely false 
doubt generated by criminal defense attorneys and their unethical 
experts: “Efforts to create doubt about AHT include the deliberate 
mischaracterization and replacement of the complex and multifaceted 
diagnostic process by a near-mechanical determination based on the 
‘triad’—the findings of subdural hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage and 
encephalopathy.”21 
A. Controversy in the Medical Literature
This claim of non-controversy, however, stands in stark contrast to 
even a casual review of the literature, both medical and legal. Contrast, 
for example, the SPR’s claim of no controversy to the following 
excerpt from the most recent official position paper of the American 
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) (one of the most adamant proponents of 
the SBS/AHT hypothesis), published in 2009: 
Few pediatric diagnoses engender as much debate as AHT, in 
part because of the social and legal consequences of the 
diagnosis. The diagnosis can result in children being removed 
from their homes, parents losing their parental rights, and 
adults being imprisoned for their actions. Controversy is 
fueled because the mechanisms and resultant injuries of 
accidental and abusive head injury overlap, the abuse is rarely 
witnessed, an accurate history of trauma is rarely offered by 
the perpetrator, there is no single or simple test to determine 
the accuracy of the diagnosis, and the legal consequences of 
the diagnosis can be so significant.22 
Child Abuse—Controversies and Imposters, 29 CURRENT PROBS. PEDIATRICS 253, 255 
(1999). 
19.  Choudhary, supra note 10, at 1048.
20.  Id. at 1049.
21.  Id. at 1050.
22.  Christian, supra note 1, at 1410. Note the assumed conclusion that it is
the “perpetrator” who is giving the “history.” 
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Likewise, when the National Association of Medical Examiners 
initially adopted a position paper endorsing the SBS hypothesis in 
2001—a paper it declined to renew when it expired five years later—the 
editor of the American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, 
which published the position paper, added a note to the published 
version of the paper explaining: “The manuscript was reviewed by 
three reviewers on the Board of Editors of the American Journal of 
Forensic Medicine and Pathology. They believed that while it was 
worthy of publication, it should not be published as a position paper 
because of the controversial nature of the subject.”23 
The medical literature is replete with similar acknowledgements of 
the controversy. Many such statements are found in writings by SBS 
critics, as one would expect.24 But many acknowledgements are also 
found in articles by physicians who accept the basic premise of the 
hypothesis,25 and even by physicians who are the most vocal proponents 
23. Mary E. Case et al., National Association of Medical Examiners, Ad Hoc 
Comm. on Shaken Baby Syndrome, Position Paper on Fatal Abusive Head Injuries in 
Infants and Young Children, 22 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. PATHOLOGY 112, 112 (2001). 
The editor also noted: “The Board of Directors responded to this opinion by stating that 
position papers always deal with controversial subjects.” Id. 
24. See, e.g., Randy Papetti et al., Outside the Echo Chamber: A Response to 
the “Consensus Statement on Abusive Head Trauma in Infants and Young Children,” 59 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299, 366 (2019) (“[SBS/AHT] is not merely controversial, but 
is perhaps the most controversial area in forensic medicine.”); RANDY PAPETTI, THE 
FORENSIC UNRELIABILITY OF THE SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME 7 (Christopher Milroy ed. 
2018) (“[T]oday such basic issues as what the ‘syndrome’ is and on what bases it is 
diagnosed are themselves hotly debated issues.”); Jacob Andersson & Ingemar Thiblin, 
National Study Shows that Abusive Head Trauma Mortality in Sweden was at Least 10 
Times Lower than in Other Western Countries, 107 ACTA PÆDIATRICA 477, 477 (2018) 
(“The validity of the diagnostic criteria for abusive head trauma (AHT) and its 
attributes has been widely debated.”); Gören Höbgerb et al., Circularity Bias in 
Abusive Head Trauma Studies Could be Diminished with a New Ranking Scale, 6 
EGYPTIAN J. FORENSIC SCI. 6, 7 (2016) (“This hypothesis has been subjected to debate 
because the causal connection between exposure and clinical findings has never been 
established.”); Steven C. Gabaeff, Exploring the Controversy in Child Abuse Pediatrics 
and False Accusations, 18 LEGAL MED. 90 (2016); JAN E. LEESTMA, FORENSIC 
NEUROPATHOLOGY 642 (3d ed. 2014); Patrick D. Barnes, Ethical Issues in Imaging 
Nonaccidental Injury: Child Abuse, 13 TOPICS IN MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 85, 
85 (2002) (“One of the most controversial areas of nonaccidental injury is the medical 
diagnosis of inflicted central nervous system injury and its impact on medical, social, 
and legal outcomes for children and families.”). 
25. See, e.g., Beth A. Costine-Bartell et al., Development of a Model of 
Hemispheric Hypodensity (“Big Black Brain”), 36 J. NEUROTRAUMA 815, 816 (2019) 
(“[T]he exact etiological mechanisms that cause injury in children with AHT remain 
controversial . . . .”); Christopher J. Hobbs & Robert A.C. Bilo, Nonaccidental 
Trauma: Clinical Aspects and Epidemiology of Child Abuse, 39 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 
457, 459 (2009) (referencing the “medial controversy” about “abuse in infants with 
head injury”); Paula Gerber & Kathryn Coffman, Nonaccidental Head Trauma in 
Infants, 23 CHILD’S NERVOUS SYS. 499, 505 (2007) (“Nonaccidental head trauma in 
infants is the leading cause of infant death from injury. The high rate of repeated abuse 
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of the SBS/AHT hypothesis.26 After the National Institutes of Health 
convened a conference in 2002 to consider the issues in SBS cases, the 
conference chair added a preface to the conference proceedings 
observing: “Because there is very little scientific experimental or 
descriptive work [on SBS], the pathophysiology remains obscure, and 
the relationship to mechanics even cloudier . . . . What we need is 
science—research and evidence that just isn’t there right now.”27 
Among the physicians recognizing the controversy is Dr. Norman 
Guthkelch, who forty years after first propounding the hypothesis 
observed that the “problem of potential child abuse . . . has caused a 
great deal of controversy since it was first described.”28 Indeed, Dr. 
Guthkelch added, “While controversy is a normal and necessary part of 
makes identification of potential cases crucial. The underlying biomechanics of injury 
in this syndrome and the purported sequelae of accidental and nonaccidental trauma 
remain controversial.”); D.M.B. Hall, The Future of Child Protection, 99 J. ROYAL
SOC’Y OF MED. 6, 7 (2006) (“[A]reas of controversy include the diagnosis of child 
sexual abuse, the problem of ‘shaken baby syndrome’ and the extent to which 
abnormally fragile bones might account for unexplained fractures.”); Scott Denton & 
Darinka Mileusnic, Delayed Sudden Death in an Infant Following an Accidental Fall: A 
Case Report with a Review of the Literature, 24 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY
371, 371 (2003) (“Several controversies exist regarding ultimately lethal head injuries in 
small children. Death from short falls, timing of head injury, lucid intervals, presence 
of diffuse axonal injury (DAI), and subdural hematoma (SDH) as a marker of DAI are 
the most recent controversial topics of debate in this evolving field of study.”). 
26.  See, e.g., Carole A. Jenny et al., Biomechanical Response of the Infant
Head to Shaking: An Experimental Investigation, 34 J. NEUROTRAUMA 1, 1 (2017) 
(“Controversy exists regarding whether violent shaking is harmful to infants in the 
absence of impact.”); Matthieu Vinchon, Reply to Pr Charles Hyman: The Scientific 
Controversy Over Abusive Head Trauma in Infants, 27 CHILD’S NERVOUS SYS. 203, 203 
(2011) (“We are well aware of the controversial nature of the series of papers . . . 
published by our team in Child’s Nervous System on the topic of infantile head injuries . 
. . .”); Christopher S. Greeley, A Witnessed Short Fall Mimicking Presumed Shaken 
Baby Syndrome (Inflicted Childhood Neurotrauma), 44 PEDIATRIC NEUROSURGERY 90, 
90 (2008) (“It is refreshing to see controversial topics addressed in the medical 
literature in such a balanced fashion. This will hopefully result in furthering our 
understanding of some of the controversies in inflicted brain injury and fewer 
unsupported opinions in legal proceedings.”); Kent P. Hymel, Carole Jenny, & Robert 
W. Block, Intracranial Hemorrhage and Rebleeding in Suspected Victims of Abusive
Head Trauma: Addressing the Forensic Controversies, 7 CHILD MALTREATMENT 329
(2002); Mark S. Dias, Inflicted Head Injury: Future Directions and Prevention, 13
NEUROSURGERY CLINICS N. AM. 247, 247 (2002) (“Despite the explosion of interest
and the clarification of certain features, many unanswered questions remain [about
AHT]. Some of the answers to these questions are difficult or even impossible to
obtain, because the medical facts are, by nature, uncertain or unreliable in many
cases.”).
27. Carole E. Nicholson, Preface to INFLICTED CHILDHOOD NEUROTRAUMA,
at ix (Robert M. Reece & Carol E. Nicholson eds., 2003) (publishing the conference 
proceedings). 
28.  A.N. Guthkelch, Problems of Infant Retino-Dural Hemorrhage with
Minimal External Injury, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201, 201 (2012). 
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scientific discourse, there has arisen a level of emotion and divisiveness 
on shaken baby syndrome/abusive head trauma that has interfered with 
our commitment to pursue the truth.”29 
B. Controversy in the Biomechanical and Scientific Literature
When one expands review of the literature to other relevant 
fields—most notably biomechanics—the depth of the controversy 
becomes even clearer.30 As the SPR acknowledges, virtually all of the 
biomechanical research has concluded that even the most vigorous 
shaking cannot generate sufficient forces to reach estimated brain injury 
thresholds.31 The biomechanical research, for example, reveals that 
vigorous shaking generates accelerations roughly equivalent to a one-
foot fall onto carpet,32 and a fall of just three to four feet generates at 
least ten times the load of the most violent shaking, well within injury 
thresholds.33 The SPR’s response, however, is not to acknowledge that 
this creates serious doubt—and hence controversy—about pure shaking 
as a mechanism of injury, but to reject the biomechanical research 
because it does not comport with these physicians’ view of reality.34 
29.  Id.
30.  See, e.g., D.R. Wolfson, D.S. McNally, M.J. Clifford & M.Vloeberghs,
Rigid-Body Modelling of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 219 J. ENGINEERING MED. 63, 66 
(2005) (“There is still controversy as to the mechanisms of injury, specifically the 
requirement for impact.”). 
31.  See, e.g., Ann-Christine Duhaime et al., The Shaken Baby Syndrome: A
Clinical, Pathological and Biomechanical Study, 66 J. NEUROSURGERY 409, 414 
(1987); Michael T. Prange et al., Anthropomorphic Simulations of Falls, Shakes, and 
Inflicted Impacts in Infants, 99 J. NEUROSURGERY 143, 149 (2003). Only two outlier 
biomechanical investigations suggest that violent shaking might possibly generate 
sufficient accelerations to produce significant brain injury, but in both cases those 
accelerations were achieved only with impact, and both articles have been subject to 
considerable criticism. Compare Jenny et al., supra note 26 and C.Z. Cory & M.D. 
Jones, Can Shaking Alone Cause Fatal Brain Injury?: A Biomechanical Assessment of 
the Duhaime Shaken Baby Syndrome Model, 43 MED. SCI. & L. 317 (2003), with Dutch 
Johnson & Roland N. Auer, Response to Jenny et al. (DOI: 10.1089/neu.2016.4687): 
Biomechanical Response of the Infant Head to Shaking: An Experimental Investigation, 
35 J. NEUROTRAMA 1045 (2018). 
32. Prange et al., supra note 31, at 146–49.
33. A.K. Ommaya et al., Biomechanics and Neuropathology of Adult and
Paediatric Head Injury, 16 BRIT. J. NEUROSURGERY 220, 226 (2002). 
34. For example, when confronted with the biomechanical research that 
indicates that shaking alone cannot cause the injuries and findings ascribed to SBS, Dr. 
Jill Glick, Professor of Pediatrics at the University of Chicago, testified in 2009 that 
“the whole point of biomechanic studies is to create what we know happens in nature 
and . . . biomechanic models have yet to recreate what happens in nature and once 
those biomechanic models create what we know happens, they will be very valuable for 
us . . . but we do know that children are shaken and have traumatic brain injury. . . . 
Not saying that every child with that trauma is shaken. I’m just saying that those that 
are shaken have been and so if we can’t create that in the lab then the lab really doesn’t 
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While there are indeed methodological challenges with the 
biomechanical research,35 no one has yet explained why or how the 
modeling might be so far off target as to produce the conclusions it has 
to date, and no one has produced other models and defensibly estimated 
injury thresholds to establish that shaking can cause such injuries. 
Biomechanics, as a whole, quite consistently alone creates the scientific 
controversy that the SPR prefers that courts not notice.36 
SBS/AHT proponents respond that, even if shaking alone cannot 
cause such injuries, there is no dispute that shaking with impact can 
(hence the name change from SBS to AHT).37 That is certainly true. 
But that does not resolve the controversies. For if impact can cause 
these injuries and the constellation of medical findings—and the 
biomechanical research confirms that it can—then is shaking even 
relevant? And if impacts can cause these injuries, how can medicine 
purport to distinguish between inflicted and accidental impacts, such as 
the impact from a short fall, or those involving and not involving 
shaking? Indeed, the biomechanical research shows not only that 
shaking is an unlikely mechanism for these injuries, but also that even 
the most vigorous shaking generates one-fiftieth of the force of short-
distance falls, such as accidental falls from furniture (beds, couches, 
changing tables, etc.).38 To rely on brain and eye injuries to diagnose 
SBS or AHT, despite a caregiver’s report of a short fall (as happens 
with some regularity), is inherently controversial, given that the 
tell us much.” Testimony of Dr. Jill Glick in Transcript of Trial at 35–36, People v. 
Rieken, No. 05-CF-75 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Feb. 19, 2005). 
35. Biomechanical research utilizes dummies (such as crash test dummies),
animal tests, cadaver tests, and computer simulations, and none are of course perfectly 
representative of the human infant body (although they are routinely accepted for 
research in other safety areas, such as automobile, playground, and sports equipment 
safety). See, e.g., Faris A. Bandak, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Biomechanics Analysis 
of Injury Mechanisms, 151 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 71, 71 (2005). Moreover, it is true that 
infant brain injury thresholds in this research are based in part on estimates and scaling 
from known adult injury thresholds, while the infant brain is not just a miniature adult 
brain. But the research is nonetheless well-grounded in established techniques, and no 
one has yet marshaled an argument to support a conclusion that the estimated infant 
injury thresholds are off by such a significant magnitude as to overcome the conclusions 
of the research—that shaking alone cannot cause the injuries ascribed to it by the SBS 
hypothesis. 
36.  See, e.g., R.W.G. Anderson et al., Biomechanical Studies in an Ovine
Model of Non-Accidental Head Injury, 47 J. BIOMECHANICS 2578, 2578 (2014) (“Many 
aspects of NAHI remain controversial and intermittently undergo revision . . . 
including whether shaking alone is sufficient to injure the brain or whether an additional 
head impact is required.”). 
37.  Id.
38.  Duhaime et al., supra note 31, at 413. See also Prange et al., supra note
31 (explaining that the peak rotational accelerations for a shake are less than those in a 
one-foot fall on to carpet). 
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biomechanical research so strongly points to the short fall as the much 
more plausible cause of the injuries.39 
C. Uncertainty about SBS Mechanisms and Conclusions
In the end, to suggest that there is no controversy, given how little 
is understood about the mechanism and pathophysiology of infant brain 
injury in these cases, is to defy both reality and reason. Yet one area in 
which there is true agreement is that these matters are not well 
understood.40 Controversy under these circumstances is inevitable, and 
it is indeed healthy for the development of scientific knowledge. 
Whenever a medical conclusion lacks gold-standard (or even 
somewhat-defined) criteria, the conclusion is inherently controversial—
at least in the sense that different physicians will interpret the 
presenting signs in different ways and will disagree about specific 
cases. And yet everyone agrees that there are no gold-standard criteria 
for SBS or AHT.41 That concession is indeed part of the reason why the 
SPR (and other SBS/AHT-hypothesis proponents) now go to such 
lengths to distance themselves from the classic triad—the presence of 
subdural hematoma, retinal hemorrhages, and encephalopathy or 
cerebral edema—as a valid standard, and to argue that the triad is a 
“straw man” and a defense construct.42 
In that regard, the SPR engages in more than a bit of revisionist 
history, as the “triad” was not constructed by defense lawyers but by 
39. Prange et al., supra note 31.
40.  See, e.g., Costine-Bartell et al., supra note 25, at 816 (“Although the
exact etiologic mechanisms that cause injury in children with AHT remain 
controversial, repetitive motions attempting to model aspects of shaking have been 
employed in some animal models to investigate injury, but none has resulted in the 
extensive SDH nor the widespread hypoxic-ischemic type damage observed after the 
more severe forms of AHT in children.”); id. at 830 (“The exact pathophysiological 
mechanisms by which widespread unilateral hemispheric hypoxic-ischemic injury is 
initiated and propagated in children are not fully understood, but similar findings were 
produced in this model in the absence of angular acceleration/deceleration.”); Gil 
Binenbaum et al., Retinal Hemorrhage and Brain Injury Patterns on Diffusion-Weighted 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging in Children with Head Trauma, 17 J. AAPOS 603, 603 
(2013) (team of SBS/AHT adherents acknowledging that “[t]here are currently multiple 
hypothesized factors in the pathogenesis of brain pathology and retinal hemorrhage in 
abusive head trauma . . . [and] the relative importance of these factors cannot be 
determined precisely based on the published data.”); id. at 604 (asserting an association 
between retinal hemorrhages and AHT but acknowledging, “however, the mechanisms 
underlying retinal hemorrhages are still not clearly established”). 
41.  See, e.g., Kent P. Hymel et al., Derivation of a Clinical Prediction Rule
for Pediatric Abusive Head Trauma, 14 PEDIATRIC CRITICAL CARE MED. 210, 212, 217 
(2013) (“Gold standard definitional criteria for AHT do not exist. . . . [I]n the absence 
of a gold standard, clinicians rarely confirm or exclude AHT with complete certainty 
and are compelled instead to adopt a probabilistic approach to the diagnosis.”). 
42.  Choudhary, supra note 10, at 1050.
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child abuse physicians and prosecutors.43 For many years those SBS-
hypothesis proponents wrote,44 taught,45 and testified46 that the presence 
43.  See P.G. Richards et al., Shaken Baby Syndrome, 91 ARCHIVES DISEASE 
CHILDHOOD 205, 205 (2006). 
44.  See, e.g., David L. Chadwick et al., Shaken Baby Syndrome—A Forensic
Pediatric Response, 101 PEDIATRICS 321, 321 (1998) (describing a letter published by 
seventy-two leading child abuse pediatricians asserting that SBS “is now a well-
characterized clinical and pathological entity with diagnostic features in severe cases 
virtually unique to this type of injury—[1] swelling of the brain (cerebral edema) 
secondary to brain injury, [2] bleeding within the head (subdural hemorrhage), and [3] 
bleeding in the interior lining of the eyes (retinal hemorrhages).”); Jeffrey M. Jentzen, 
Pathological Findings in Fatal Shaken Impact Syndrome, in THE SHAKEN BABY
SYNDROME: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 199, 201 (Stephen J. Lazoritz & Vincent 
J. Palusci eds., 2001) (“[The] classical findings of retinal hemorrhages, subdural
hematoma, and brain swelling cannot be fully explained by any other medical entity.”);
B. Harding, R. Anthony Risdon, & Henry F. Krous, Shaken Baby Syndrome:
Pathological Diagnosis Rests on the Combined Triad, not on Individual Injuries, 328
BRIT. MED. J. 720, 720 (2004); Richards et al., supra note 43 (“The triad of
encephalopathy, subdural haemorrhages, and retinal haemorrhages as an indicator of
head injury has stood the test of time.”); Matthieu Vinchon et al., Confessed Abuse
Versus Witnessed Accidents in Infants: Comparison of Clinical, Radiological, and
Ophthalmological Data in Corroborated Cases, 26 CHILD’S NERVOUS SYS. 637, 637
(2010) (“The hallmarks of shaken baby syndrome (SBS) are subdural hematomas
(SDH), encephalopathy, and retinal hemorrhage (RH).”); Brian K. Holmgren,
Prosecuting the Shaken Infant Case, in THE SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME: A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 275, 319 (Stephen J. Lazoritz & Vincent J. Palusci
eds., 2001) (“The expert who acknowledges the classic findings of SBS including
subdural hematoma, retinal hemorrhage and edema, but chooses to ignore this
constellation of findings in favor of an alternative hypothesis will appear foolish.”);
Paula Gerber & Kathryn Coffman, Nonaccidental Head Trauma in Infants, 23 CHILD’S
NERVOUS SYS. 499, 499 (2007) (“Clinical features that suggest inflicted head trauma
include the triad of the so-called shaken baby syndrome, consisting of retinal
hemorrhage, subdural, and/or subarachnoid hemorrhage in an infant with little signs of
external trauma.”).
45. For example, authoritative child-abuse textbooks in the late 1990s and
early 2000s acknowledged the triad and declared it in its complete form to be 
pathognomonic (distinctively characteristic) of SBS. See Robert A. Kirschner, The 
Pathology of Child Abuse, in THE BATTERED CHILD 272–73 (Mary Edna Helfer et al. 
eds., 5th ed. 1997) (“SBS usually produces a diagnostic triad of injuries . . . [which] 
must be considered virtually pathognomonic of SBS in the absence of documented 
extraordinary blunt force such as an automobile accident.”); Kenneth W. Reichert & 
Meic Schmidt, Neurologic Sequelae of Shaken Baby Syndrome, in THE SHAKEN BABY 
SYNDROME: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 79, 83 (Stephen Lazoritz & Vincent J. 
Palusci eds., 2001) (“For all practical purposes, however, retinal hemorrhages in 
association with acute subdural hemorrhaging means that a violent shaking with or 
without impact occurred.”); Robert H. Kirschner & Harry Wilson, Pathology of Fatal 
Abuse, in CHILD ABUSE: MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT 503 (Robert M. Reece 
& Stephen Ludwig eds., 2d ed. 2001) (“Shaken Baby Syndrome . . .  usually produces 
a triad of injuries that includes cerebral edema, subdural hemorrhage, and retinal 
hemorrhages. No other medical condition fully mimics all of its features.”). See also 
Rob Parrish, Executive Summary of the Third National Conference on Shaken Baby 
Syndrome 1 (2000), https://www.dontshake.org/media/k2/attachments/2000-
SaltLakeCityProgram.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9P7-5U8P] (“Often referred to as the 
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of the “triad”—and sometimes even single elements of the triad47—were 
pathognomonic for abuse.48 We are gratified to see that, today, 
proponents of the SBS/AHT hypothesis acknowledge that neither the 
triad nor any other specific findings can be relied upon conclusively to 
diagnose abuse.49 That is scientific progress, and it resolves one area of 
dispute—but by no means all, for it now creates other controversies 
about what physicians can rely upon to diagnose abuse. 
Yet even SBS/AHT hypothesis proponents acknowledge that, in 
the absence of agreed-upon criteria, the determination is inherently 
controversial and difficult. As Leventhal and colleagues have observed, 
“Making or refuting a diagnosis of abusive head trauma is 
challenging.”50 Leventhal bemoans this reality as one of the “key 
challenges” facing physicians when evaluating young children for 
abuse.51 Leventhal observes: 
‘triad,’ the consensus appears to be that a collection of (1) damage to the brain, 
evidenced by severe brain swelling and/or diffuse traumatic axonal injury; (2) bleeding 
under the membranes which cover the brain, usually subdural and/or subarachnoid 
bleeding; and, (3) bleeding in the layers of the retina, often accompanied by other 
ocular damage, when seen in young children or infants, is virtually diagnostic of 
severe, whiplash shaking of the head.”). 
46.  See DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER, FLAWED CONVICTIONS: “SHAKEN BABY
SYNDROME” AND THE INERTIA OF INJUSTICE 7–12, 31–44 (2014) (citing examples of 
courtroom testimony). 
47.  See, e.g., Arthur B. Eisenbrey, Retinal Hemorrhage in the Battered
Child, 5 CHILD’S BRAIN 40, 42 (1979) (“[R]etinal hemorrhage in children under [three] 
with or without other evidence of injury is pathognomonic of the battered child 
syndrome.”); J.E. Carter & A.Q. McCormick, Whiplash Shaking Syndrome: Retinal 
Hemorrhages and Computerized Axial Tomography of the Brain, 7 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 279, 280 (1983) (“[B]ilateral extensive pale-centered retinal hemorrhages . . . 
are considered pathognomonic of the syndrome of whiplash shaking injury and of child 
abuse.”); ROB PARRISH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BATTERED CHILD SYNDROME:
INVESTIGATING PHYSICAL ABUSE AND HOMICIDE 8 (4th prtg. 2002) (“According to all 
credible studies in the past several years, retinal hemorrhage in infants is, for all 
practical purposes, conclusive evidence of shaken baby syndrome in the absence of a 
good explanation,” such as severe automobile accidents and falls from several stories 
onto a hard surface.). See also PAPETTI, supra note 24, at 51 n.175 (citing literature 
and case testimony claiming SBS diagnosis on the basis of one or two features of the 
triad). 
48.  See Papetti, supra note 24, at 54 n.183 (citing much of the literature in
which the triad was deemed essentially pathognomonic for SBS/AHT). 
49.  See, e.g., Sandeep Narang, A Daubert Analysis of Abusive Head
Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 505, 571 (2011) 
(“However, the mere presence alone of SDHs and RHs does not establish a diagnosis 
of AHT.”). 
50.  John M. Leventhal et al., Diagnosing Abusive Head Trauma: The
Challenges Faced by Clinicians, 44 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY (SPECIAL ISSUE: ABUSIVE
HEAD TRAUMA) S537, S541 (2014). 
51.  Id. at S538.
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A . . . challenge occurs when families receive dissimilar 
information from different clinicians about the likelihood of 
abuse. When some clinicians tell families that they are 
concerned about abuse and other clinicians indicate that abuse 
is being ruled out or that the child is cleared, families may not 
only become confused, but also have a tendency to split the 
clinicians into good and bad ones. These inconsistencies in 
how clinicians discuss the likelihood of abuse with families 
help reinforce the view that the caregiver did nothing wrong 
and that the physicians cannot even decide if the child was 
abused.52 
No wonder physicians who style themselves as child-abuse 
specialists want to deny the validity of any disagreements or 
controversies, and attempt to silence or delegitimize all who disagree. 
D. Controversy in the Face of Claimed Consensus
Publication of the SPR “consensus” statement does not resolve the 
controversies. It is dangerous and inappropriate to suggest that, because 
the SPR has published a statement proclaiming consensus among 
pediatric radiologists, the matters are settled and free of all 
controversy. As has been widely observed, “[s]cience is not a 
democracy.”53 Moreover, under the regime created by Daubert, the 
mere say-so of a guild of experts, no matter how unified they might be, 
is never enough, in law or in science; what matters is whether the 
scientific claims are adequately supported by scientific evidence. As 
one of us observed some years ago:  
The guild test does at least claim to deal with reliability of the 
process beyond individual experience, but the reliability 
judgment is delegated to a group that, by definition, already 
believes in the process. The guild test trades the ipse dixit of 
the individual for the ipse dixit of the group.54  
Or as Dr. Norman Guthkelch observed in 2012, “the issue is not 
what the majority of doctors (or lawyers) think but rather what is 
52.  Id.
53.  Jacek Z. Kubiak, Science is Not a Democracy, 50 INT’L J.
DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 586, 587 (2006). 
54. D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic
Science after Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 777 
(2000). 
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supported by reliable scientific evidence . . . .”55 And as the authors of 
a recent Swedish government report on the weak scientific foundation 
for the SBS hypothesis put it, “we need to distinguish between 
evidence-based knowledge and state-of-the-art consensus and, if we 
expect to achieve a reflective equilibrium, then the consensus should be 
adapted to the evidence and not vice-versa.”56 
In any event, one should not be misled by the claim that the SPR 
statement truly reflects “consensus,” at least not in the way the word 
ordinarily suggests. The “consensus” statement was not approved or 
even voted upon by all, or even a majority, of the membership of the 
SPR.57 It was not even subjected to debate by the membership.58 It was, 
instead, the product of a small group of true-believers in SBS/AHT, 
appointed by the SPR’s governing body. Of the committee’s fifteen 
members, almost all had previously staked out published opinions 
defending the SBS/AHT hypothesis or attacking its critics,59 several are 
55. Gut hkelch, supra note 28, at 207–08. See also Christopher Milroy, 
Foreward to RANDY PAPETTI, THE FORENSIC UNRELIABILITY OF THE SHAKEN BABY 
SYNDROME, at xiii (2018) (“[T]hese issues should not turn on past or even current 
acceptance of SBS and AHT beliefs among physicians; these are matters or reliability, 
not popularity.”). 
56. Niels LynØe & Anders Eriksson, Consensus Should be Adapted to the 
Evidence and not Vice-Versa, 107 ACTA PÆDIATRICA 1476, 1476 (2018). 
57. Two of us (Barnes and Mack) are members of the SPR, received the 
initial draft, and provided written feedback, but were never offered an opportunity to 
vote on the paper before it was issued. Nor was their written response ever published or 
shared with the general membership of the SPR. 
58. Id . Nor were Barnes and Mack, as members of the SPR, invited to 
participate in any discussion among the membership, beyond the opportunity to submit 
their ignored response letter. 
59. See, e.g., Dawn Saunders, Maria Raissaki, Sabah Servaes, Catherine
Adamsbaum, Arabinda Kumar Choudhary, Joëlle Anne Moreno, Rick R. van Rijn, 
Amaka C. Offiah, Throwing the Baby out with the Bath Water—Response to the 
Swedish Agency for Health Technology Assessment and Assessment of Social Services 
(SBU) Report on Traumatic Shaking, 47 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 1386, 1388 (2017); 
Thomas. L. Slovis et al., The Creation of Non-Disease: An Assault on the Diagnosis of 
Child Abuse, 42 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 903, 903 (2012); Robert W. Block & Vincent 
J. Palusci, Child Abuse Pediatrics: A New Pediatric Subspecialty, 148 J. PEDIATRICS 
711, 711 (2006); Gary L. Hedlund & Lori D. Frasier, Neuroimaging of Abusive Head 
Trauma, 5 FORENSIC SCI. MED. & PATHOLOGY 280, 281 (2009); Narang, supra note
49; Mark S. Dias, The Case for Shaking, in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: DIAGNOSIS,
TREATMENT, AND EVIDENCE 364, 364–65 (Carole Jenny ed., 2011); Christian &
Block, supra note 1 (SPR “consensus” paper co-author highlighted in bold); V.
Michelle Silvera et al., Retroclival Collections Associated with Abusive Head Trauma
in Children, 44 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY (SPECIAL ISSUE) S621, S630 (2014); Maura E.
Ryan et al., ACR Appropriateness Criteria Head Trauma—Child, 11 J. AM. C. 
RADIOLOGY 939, 943 (2014); Elizabeth E. Gilles & Marvin D. Nelson, Jr., Cerebral 
Complications of Nonaccidental Head Injury in Childhood, 19 PEDIATRIC NEUROLOGY 
119, 125 (1998). Individuals highlighted in bold were co-authors of the SPR 
“consensus” paper.
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not radiologists, but child-abuse pediatricians60 and a pediatric 
neurosurgeon61 who are all leading advocates of the hypothesis, and one 
is not a physician,62 but is instead the only law professor who has 
published widely in support of the hypothesis63 and against the growing 
body of legal scholarship64 and judicial decisions65 that challenge the 
hypothesis or the definitiveness of the “diagnosis.” 
Moreover, the process leading to the publication of the SPR 
statement appears to have been designed to eliminate the possibility of 
real debate and disagreement. The statement claims to have undergone 
a “rigorous” consensus process, including dissemination to the SPR’s 
membership “for comment and if necessary further revisions.”66 But 
the membership first received notice of this document on October 17, 
2017, when they received an email accompanied by a fifty-page, 211-
60. Sandeep K. Narang and Cindy W. Christian.
61. Mark S. Dias.
62.  Joëlle Anne Moreno, J.D., Florida International College of Law.
Professor Moreno’s participation as a co-author further confirms the essentially legal 
nature of the paper and the purported “diagnosis.” 
63. See Joëlle Anne Moreno & Brian Holmgren, Dissent into Confusion: The
Supreme Court, Denialism, and the False “Scientific” Controversy over Shaken Baby 
Syndrome, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 153; Joëlle Anne Moreno & Brian Holmgren, The 
Supreme Court Screws Up the Science: There Is No Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby 
Syndrome “Scientific” Controversy, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1357. 
64.  See Findley et al., supra note 3, at 241–43, 305; TUERKHEIMER, supra
note 46, at 17–31; Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby 
Syndrome and the Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2009); Deborah 
Tuerkheimer, Science-Dependent Prosecution and the Problem of Epistemic 
Contingency: A Study of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 62 ALA. L. REV. 513 (2011); Keith 
A. Findley & D. Michael Risinger, The Science and Law Underlying Post-Conviction
Challenges to Shaken Baby Syndrome Convictions: A Response to Professor
Imwinkelried, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1209. 1211–13 (2018); Deborah W. Denno,
Concocting Criminal Intent, 105 GEO. L.J. 323 (2017); Caitlin M. Plummer & Imran J.
Syed, “Shifted Science” Revisited: Percolation Delays and the Persistence of Wrongful
Convictions Based on Outdated Science, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483 (2016); Eza Bella
Zakirova, Shaken Baby Syndrome: As a Controversy in Wrongful Conviction Cases, 81
ALB. L. REV. 1027 (2017–18); Keith Findley et al., Examining Shaken Baby Syndrome
Convictions in Light of New Medical Scientific Research, 37 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
219 (2012); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Genuine Battle of the
Scientific (and Non-Scientific) Experts, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 156 (2010); Molly Gena,
Comment, Shaken Baby Syndrome: Medical Uncertainty Casts Doubts on Convictions,
2007 WIS. L. REV. 701; Lauren Quint, Note, Bridging the Gap: An Application of
Social Frameworks Evidence to Shaken Baby Syndrome, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1839 (2011);
Rachel Burg, Note, Un-Convicting the Innocent: The Case for Shaken Baby Syndrome
Review Panels, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 657 (2012); Genie Lyons, Comment & Note,
Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Questionable Scientific Syndrome and a Dangerous Legal
Concept, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1109; Daniel G. Orenstein, Shaken to the Core:
Emerging Scientific Opinion and Post-Conviction Relief in Cases of Shaken Baby
Syndrome, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1305 (2011).
65.  See cases cited supra note 4.
66. Choudhary et al., supra note 10, at 1058 tbl.6.
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reference version of the “consensus statement.”67 The membership was 
invited to submit responses, but was given only ten days, until October 
27, 2017, for any such responses.68 Despite the shortness of this time, 
at least two prominent members of the SPR (and co-authors of this 
response)—Dr. Patrick D. Barnes at Stanford and Dr. Julie A. Mack at 
Pennsylvania State University—managed to submit a substantive, four-
page, single-spaced response, identifying numerous areas of 
disagreement and concern.69 In their letter, Drs. Barnes and Mack also 
wrote that, “[b]ecause of the short timeframe for comment, which is 
limited to SPR members, our feedback is abbreviated.”70 They added 
that they were providing “these preliminary comments to meet the 
October 27 deadline, but ask for an opportunity to submit a more 
complete response.”71 If the consensus statement were to be published, 
they added, “we ask that the response be published with the Statement 
or shortly thereafter. We also recommend that comments be invited 
from other interested parties.”72 The SPR ignored the letter and each of 
its requests, and proceeded to publish the statement, proclaiming 
“consensus.”73 
The SPR also cites a survey of physicians likely to be involved in 
diagnosing SBS/AHT to claim strong support for the diagnosis.74 The 
survey reports strong support among child-abuse physicians for the 
SBS/AHT diagnosis.75 That finding is hardly surprising, however, since 
the survey was targeted to those physicians “most commonly involved 
in suspected AHT cases.”76 
Even within this survey, however, the data shows that one group 
of physicians—the group actually trained to assess cause of death, 
pathologists—diverges from the other physicians in their views about 
SBS and AHT. Among the relatively small cohort of pathologists 
included in this survey (n=27), fewer than half, only 40.7 percent 
(eleven of twenty-seven) responded yes when asked if SBS is a valid 
67. Letter dated from Drs. Patrick D. Barnes & Julie A. Mack to the Society
for Pediatric Radiology (Oct. 27, 2017) (on file with the authors). The letter is attached 
in full as Appendix 1 to this Article. 
68.  Id.
69.  Id.
70.  Id.
71.  Id.
72.  Id.
73.  See Choudhary et al., supra note 10.
74.  Id. at 1058 (citing Sandeep K. Narang et al., Acceptance of Shaken Baby
Syndrome and Abusive Head Trauma as Medical Diagnoses, 177 J. PEDIATRICS 273 
(2016)). 
75.  Id. at 1049–50.
76. Sandeep K. Narang et al., Acceptance of Shaken Baby Syndrome and
Abusive Head Trauma as Medical Diagnoses, 177 J. PEDIATRICS 273, 274 (2016). 
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diagnosis; the remainder—the majority—were divided evenly between 
saying no and that they did not know or were unsure.77 A much higher 
percentage of pathologists—92.6 percent—responded that the broader 
diagnosis, AHT, is valid, but that tells us only that they believe that 
abusive head trauma (which would include blunt force trauma to the 
head) exists (which no one doubts in the abstract); it tells us nothing 
about whether these pathologists believe they can reliably determine 
AHT caused by shaking or shaking with impact on the basis of a few 
brain and eye findings, whether they can reliably rule out alternative 
causes, whether children so abused can experience a lucid interval 
before collapse, etc.—that is, it tells us nothing about the subset of 
issues on which there is real controversy in AHT.78 Elsewhere, other 
survey research suggests that the controversy is indeed widespread 
among pathologists.79 And note that this survey tells us nothing about 
the views of the other group of scientists whose research 
overwhelmingly challenges the SBS/AHT hypothesis—the 
biomechanical engineers; they were not included in the survey at all. 
This survey simply does not prove an absence of controversy in the 
relevant scientific community taken as a whole. 
Moreover, while the survey shows high levels of support among 
child-abuse physicians for the belief that SBS and AHT are valid 
diagnoses, and that shaking with or without impact is likely or highly 
likely to cause subdural hematomas, retinal hemorrhages, and coma or 
death, the survey masks nuances that lie at the heart of the real 
controversies. 
First, it is worth noting that even among this group of physicians, 
belief in SBS/AHT is not universal—eighty-eight percent endorsed SBS 
as a general proposition and ninety-three percent endorsed AHT as a 
general proposition.80 Second, among these physicians, more reported 
believing that shaking with impact was likely to produce subdural 
hematoma, retinal hemorrhage, and coma or death than believed that 
shaking alone could cause each of these outcomes.81 Indeed, even 
77.  Id. at 277.
78.  Id.
79.  See Stephen J. Cina, Controversies in Forensic Pathology: Results of a
2010 Survey of NAME Fellows, 2 ACADEM. FORENSICS PATHOLOGY 150, 151 (2012) 
(on-line survey data showing that by 2010 more than one-third of surveyed medical 
examiners no longer believed that it was even “possible to cause lethal closed head 
injuries in a small child by shaking alone”—let alone that they could diagnose abuse on 
the basis of the triad or related medical findings). 
80. Narang et al., supra note 76, at 275.
81. For example, just under ninety percent believed that shaking with impact
was likely or highly likely to produce subdural hematoma compared to approximately 
eighty-three percent for shaking alone. And while approximately eighty-nine percent 
believed that shaking with impact was likely or highly likely to lead to coma or death, 
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among this group, fewer than eighty percent reported believing that 
pure shaking without impact is likely or highly likely to produce coma 
or death.82 Clearly, even among this group of child-abuse physicians, 
the matters are not free from controversy. 
Second, even among the group who responded that pure shaking or 
shaking with impact was likely to produce subdural hematoma, retinal 
hemorrhage, and coma or death, this survey does not tell us whether 
these physicians believe that they can reliably “diagnose” SBS/AHT 
based on any individual or particular collection of these findings. Nor 
does it tell us other important but more nuanced specifics, such as 
whether these physicians believe that injury caused by shaking would 
also necessarily produce neck or spinal cord injury (which is rarely 
seen in SBS/AHT). Yet questions like these are where the controversies 
are most pronounced. 
Finally, it is difficult to know exactly what to make of some of the 
survey results. The survey shows, for example, that only 3.1 percent of 
responding physicians reported a belief that short falls are likely or 
highly likely to result in death or coma.83 Given that short-fall deaths 
are now widely recognized in the literature and in well-documented 
case reports (including videotaped short-fall deaths),84 it is hard to 
believe that nearly ninety-seven percent of responding physicians 
believe that short falls cannot kill. Rather, it seems more likely that 
many respondents were interpreting this question to assess the 
likelihood that a death in any given case might have been the result of a 
short fall, given that everyone agrees that short-fall deaths are rare. But 
child deaths resulting from abuse that leaves no external injury are also 
rare. The real controversy, then, is how rare such short-fall deaths are, 
and how physicians can distinguish between cases where a reported 
short fall was the cause of a child’s coma or death and those in which it 
was not. Again, that is where the real controversy lies; this survey 
masks that real controversy. 
fewer than eighty percent believed that shaking alone could produce such consequences. 
Id. at 276. 
82.  Id.
83.  Id.
84.  See, e.g., John Plunkett, Fatal Pediatric Head Injuries Caused by Short-
Distance Falls, 22 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 1 (2001); John R. Hall et al., 
The Mortality of Childhood Falls, 29 J. TRAUMA 1273 (1989); Patrick E. Lantz & 
Daniel E. Couture, Fatal Acute Intracranial Injury, Subdural Hematoma, and Retinal 
Hemorrhages Caused by Stairway Fall, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1648 (2011); David L. 
Chadwick et al., Annual Risk of Death Resulting From Short Falls Among Young 
Children: Less Than 1 in 1 Million, 121 PEDIATRICS 1213 (2008). 
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E. Broad Claims, Nuanced Controversies
As this discussion suggests, to some extent the question about 
whether there is controversy depends on what the precise proposition is 
that is at issue. In this regard, the SPR statement is misleading. The 
SPR claims that there is no dispute about the validity of the AHT 
conclusions. If by this the SPR means that there is no dispute that AHT 
occurs—that is, that adults can cause brain injuries to infants and 
toddlers by physically abusing them, and that such abuse will 
sometimes produce medically recognizable signs (even if they are not 
specific for abuse)—then there is indeed no dispute. No one disputes 
that child abuse is real.85 Hence, the SPR misleads when it repeatedly 
labels the critics of the SBS/AHT hypothesis as “denialists.” The SPR 
cites no literature or courtroom testimony—and none can be found—in 
which any of the SBS/AHT critics denies that abusive head trauma and 
other forms of child abuse are real, or even that violently shaking a 
child is an unsafe thing to do. 
But that does not mean there are no disputes. What is in dispute—
given the lack of any “gold-standard” criteria for AHT, and the 
undeniable reality that all of the physical findings also have multiple 
non-abusive etiologies—is whether physicians can reliably determine 
the existence of SBS or AHT primarily on the basis of brain, eye, and 
related findings. Also in dispute is whether shaking alone can cause the 
serious brain injuries typical in these cases, at least without also causing 
massive neck injury (which, again, is almost never present86), and a 
host of subsidiary questions, such as the mechanism of the injury (e.g., 
is subdural hemorrhage the product of torn bridging veins or is it the 
product of bleeding from the numerous more fragile vessels in the dura; 
is the encephalopathy the product of physical tearing of nerves, or does 
it arise from hypoxia-ischemia?87), how to interpret the possibility of 
alternative causes of injury, whether a child could have experienced a 
significant period of lucidity between injury and collapse, and the like.88 
Those are serious scientific questions, not the thoughtless 
dismissiveness of “denialists.” 
85.  See Papetti et al., supra note 24, at 311–12.
86.  See Robert M. Reece, Controversies in Shaken Baby/Shaken Impact
Syndrome, in THE SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 384 
(Stephen Lazoritz & Vincent J. Palusci eds., 2001) (“Injuries to the neck muscles or 
cervical vertebrae are distinctly uncommon in SBS/SIS.”); see also PAPETTI, supra note 
24, at 51 n.175 (citing literature and cases). 
87.  See Papetti et al., supra note 24, at 320–33.
88.  See Findley et al., supra note 3, at 245.
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F. Recognizing Controversy: Independent Scientific Reviews
Given all of the challenges to researching and diagnosing child 
abuse, it is no wonder that when independent scientists—those steeped 
in knowledge of and fidelity to rigorous scientific principles and 
methods—examine SBS/AHT, they find it wanting. The most notable 
among such inquiries was undertaken by the Swedish Agency for 
Health Technology Assessment and Assessment of Social Services 
(SBU).89 The SBU appointed a panel of leading pediatricians and 
experts in forensic medicine, radiology, medical epidemiology, and 
medical and research ethics to undertake a systematic review of the 
medical literature to assess the underlying strength of the SBS 
hypothesis and the diagnostic validity of the triad.90 After retrieving 
3,773 medical papers and identifying 1065 of them as relevant, the 
SBU found that only thirty met the inclusion criteria of potentially 
providing evidence on the diagnostic value of the triad,91 and of those, 
only two were of moderate quality; none were of high quality; and all 
the rest were low quality.92 Hence, the SBU concluded, “There is 
insufficient scientific evidence on which to assess the diagnostic 
accuracy of the triad in identifying traumatic shaking (very low quality 
evidence).”93 In particular, the SBU noted that, because the research 
base is riddled with methodological flaws, including massive 
circularity, the “[s]ensitivity, specificity and predictive values” 
produced by the research result in “incorrect conclusions” and 
“incorrect calculations of incidence.”94 In sum, the SBU concluded that 
the evidentiary foundation for SBS is of “very low quality.”95 
When SBS/AHT-supporting pediatricians, somewhat predictably, 
lashed out at the Swedish report, its authors responded, clarifying and 
re-emphasizing the weakness of the scientific basis for medical 
conclusions of SBS: “As the triad is a very important criterion used by 
child protection teams, the extremely high diagnostic accuracy of the 
89. Swedish Agency for Health Technology Assessment and Assessment of
Social Services, Traumatic Shaking: The Role of the Triad in Medical Investigations of 
Suspected Traumatic Shaking—A Systematic Review (2016) [hereinafter SBU Report], 
https://www.sbu.se/255e [https://perma.cc/J5YW-S53C]. 
90.  See Måns Rosén et al., Shaken Baby Syndrome and the Risk of Losing
Scientific Scrutiny, 106 ACTA PÆDIATRICA 1905 (2017). 
91. SBU Report, supra note 89, at 17–22.
92.  Id. at 22–25.
93.  Id. at 5.
94.  Id. at 30.
95.  Id. at 61.
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triad is obviously not based on scientific criteria but rather on circular 
reasoning. In other words, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy.”96 
Previously, in Canada, in 2008, the government of Ontario 
conducted an exhaustive inquiry into pediatric forensic pathology in the 
province.97 The product was a 674-page report, which became known 
as the Goudge Inquiry, after Court of Appeal Judge Stephen Goudge, 
who was Commissioner of the inquiry.98 The inquiry was instigated by 
concerns about the pediatric pathology system in general, and in 
particular about one apparently rogue pediatric forensic pathologist—
Dr. Charles Smith—who dominated the field in Ontario for years.99 But 
in the course of investigating the field, the Goudge Inquiry identified 
the same potential problems with SBS that have fueled the debates 
elsewhere for the past two decades. The Report noted that “one of the 
deepest controversies surrounding pediatric forensic pathology concerns 
shaken baby syndrome,”100 and described the matter as “fraught with 
controversy.”101 
Most recently, in the United States, in 2016, the President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST)—a group of 
respected scientists from a variety of disciplines—issued a report 
assessing the scientific status of a host of traditional forensic 
disciplines, focusing particularly on feature-comparison disciplines.102 
Although SBS/AHT is not a feature-comparison discipline, PCAST was 
concerned enough about the scientific underpinnings of the SBS/AHT 
hypothesis that it observed: “PCAST notes that there are issues related 
to the scientific validity of other types of forensic evidence that are 
beyond the scope of this report but require urgent attention—including 
notably arson science and abusive head trauma commonly referred to as 
‘Shaken Baby Syndrome.’”103 A medical conclusion truly well-
96. Niels LynØe et al., Authors’ Overarching Reply to All the Responses
Received to the Systematic Literature Review on Shaken Baby Syndrome, 106 ACTA
PÆDIATRICA 1031, 1031 (2017). 
97.  STEPHEN T. GOUDGE, THE INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY
IN ONTARIO (2008), 
https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/goudge/report/v1_en_pdf/Vol_1_E
ng.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRJ8-788X]. 
98.  Id.
99.  Id. at 3–8.
100.  Id. at 527.
101.  Id. at 528.
102.  EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF
ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE
COMPARISON METHODS (Sept. 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_
forensic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AKM-LVJC]. 
103.  Id. at 23 n.15.
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grounded in scientific research and free of significant doubt or 
controversy is hardly the kind of field whose “scientific validity” 
requires “urgent attention.” 
Again, the insights of Dr. Guthkelch are helpful: 
“Getting it right” requires that we distinguish between 
hypotheses and knowledge. SBS and AHT are hypotheses that 
have been advanced to explain findings that are not yet fully 
understood. There is nothing wrong in advancing such 
hypotheses; this is how medicine and science progress. It is 
wrong, however, to fail to advise parents and courts when 
these are simply hypotheses, not proven medical or scientific 
facts, or to attack those who point out problems with these 
hypotheses or who advance alternatives.104 
G. Judicial Recognitions of the Shifting Science and Attendant
Controversy 
In light of all these concerns, when courts have been pressed to 
assess the debates about SBS/AHT, most notably in postconviction 
proceedings in which the defendant seeks a new trial because new 
research reflects legitimate controversy while the state’s evidence at 
trial presented the matters as settled science, they invariably find 
emerging and growing legitimate debate—or even that many aspects of 
the old SBS hypothesis have been proven false.105 The SPR would write 
these off as the decisions of guileless judges hoodwinked by 
deliberately misleading defense arguments and theories. But these 
decisions almost always issue after the court has heard extensive 
testimony from leading and knowledgeable experts on both sides of the 
debates, including extensive consideration of the relevant medical and 
scientific literature. And often their rulings are based on admissions 
that even prosecution experts have had to make about shifting 
understandings and evolving research in the field. While science can 
indeed be challenging for judges, these are not uninformed decisions. 
In the first such case to recognize the controversies and overturn a 
conviction, for example, involving a respected and much-loved in-home 
daycare provider named Audrey Edmunds, the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals vacated the conviction on the basis of new research challenging 
the triad-based medical-expert opinions that had formed the heart of the 
State’s case at Edmunds’s trial in 1997.106 The postconviction 
104.  Guthkelch, supra note 28, at 207.
105.  See cases discussed supra note 4 and accompanying text.
106.  See State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). Full
disclosure: One of us (Findley) was counsel for Edmunds in that case, and another 
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proceedings nearly a decade later produced expert evidence from ten 
doctors—six for the defense and four for the State, over four days of 
testimony.107 Reviewing that record, the appellate court ruled that: 
Edmunds presented evidence that was not discovered until 
after her conviction, in the form of expert medical testimony, 
that a significant and legitimate debate in the medical 
community has developed in the past ten years over whether 
infants can be fatally injured through shaking alone, whether 
an infant may suffer head trauma and yet experience a 
significant lucid interval prior to death, and whether other 
causes may mimic the symptoms traditionally viewed as 
indicating shaken baby or shaken impact syndrome.108 
In Rochester, New York, in 2014, a court held a postconviction 
hearing spanning three weeks, at which it heard, in addition to the four 
experts who had testified at trial in 2001–2002, from an additional 
thirteen experts—eight for the defense and five for the prosecution.109 
At the conclusion of those proceedings, the court granted a new trial, 
finding that “the credible evidence adduced at the Hearing, which was 
supported by expert testimony from different disciplines and 
specialties—pediatrics, radiology, pathology, ophthalmology, and 
biomechanical engineering established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that key medical propositions relied upon by the Prosecution 
at Trial were either demonstrably wrong, or are now subject to new 
debate.”110 The trial court’s decision was affirmed on appeal.111 
Among the more dramatic of such cases was the holding of a 
federal judge in the Northern District of Illinois in 2014. After hearing 
from multiple experts, the court held that Jennifer Del Prete had proved 
her actual innocence in an SBS case sufficiently to permit her to 
proceed in federal habeas corpus despite having procedurally defaulted 
her constitutional claims in state court.112 In addition to finding—based 
on consideration of the extensive expert testimony presented—that Del 
(Barnes) was one of the experts who testified on behalf of Edmunds in the 
postconviction proceedings. 
107.  Id. at 593.
108.  Id. at 596.
109.  See People v. Bailey, 999 N.Y.S.2d 713, 715–22 (2014). Full disclosure:
One of us (Findley) was co-counsel for the defendant, Rene Bailey, in that case, and 
two of us (Barnes and Mack) were expert witnesses for the defense in the 
postconviction proceedings. 
110.  Id. at 726.
111.  People v. Bailey, 144 A.D.3d 1562 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
112.  Del Prete v. Thompson, 10 F. Supp. 3d 907 (N.D. Ill. 2014). Full
disclosure: One of us (Barnes) testified as an expert witness for the defense in this case, 
and another (Mack) consulted with experts for the defense but did not testify. 
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Prete was probably innocent of the SBS offense, the court added in a 
footnote that “the . . . recent [scientific] developments in this area . . . 
arguably suggest[] that a claim of shaken baby syndrome is more an 
article of faith than a proposition of science.”113 
Just as this article was going to print, the en banc Court of Appeals 
of the State of Mississippi issued a decision holding that it was error to 
admit the opinion of a pediatrician purporting to “diagnose” SBS. In 
the course of its ruling, the Court observed that the record included 
“evidence that showed the reliability of SBS as a diagnosis is being 
increasingly challenged and questioned . . . .”114 The court also 
observed that the prosecution’s pediatrician “agreed that many articles 
in many different disciplines, from neuropathology to biomechanical 
engineering, discount SBS as a reliable diagnosis.”115 Further, the court 
noted that it had been presented with “numerous cites to studies and 
peer-reviewed articles, that reflected the scientific community may no 
longer wholly accept SBS.”116 
In sum, despite the SPR’s claim of “consensus,” the reliability of 
SBS/AHT diagnoses is very much a matter of serious and widespread 
controversy, in both medical and legal fora. 
II. IS AHT A “MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS” OR A “LEGAL CONCLUSION”?
A. The SPR’s Claims
The SPR emphatically proclaims that the AHT conclusion “is a 
medical conclusion, not a legal determination . . . .”117 The significance 
of this claim is two-fold. First, it supposedly justifies permitting 
physicians to render opinions about the etiology of a child’s brain 
injuries based on determinations that are often made by 
multidisciplinary child-abuse-prevention teams that include not only 
physicians, but also social workers, police officers, and prosecutors.118 
113.  Id. at 957–58 n.10.
114.  Clark v. State, 2017-KA-00411-COA, 2019 WL 5566234, ¶ 33 (Miss. Ct.
App. Oct. 29, 2019). 
115.  Id. ¶ 41.
116.  Id. ¶ 47.
117. Choudhary et al., supra note 10, at 1049.
118.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OFFICE 
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, FORMING A MULTIDISCIPLINARY
TEAM TO INVESTIGATE CHILD ABUSE 5–6 (Nov. 1998) (“In many States, the 
membership of MDT’s [Multi-Disciplinary Teams] is defined by statute. Generally, 
laws authorizing or requiring the formation of investigative MDT’s specify that law 
enforcement, child protection or family services, and prosecution participate. Even if 
your State does not require such membership, these three disciplines and the medical 
professions should be considered the core of any investigative MDT.”). 
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The resulting determinations are often made on the basis of facts well 
beyond the presenting medical conditions, such as caregiver demeanor 
or perceived inconsistencies in the caregiver’s narrative of events.119 
Second, it lays the groundwork for telling lawyers and courts that they 
cannot second-guess the physicians and must defer to their judgment on 
whether a child has been abused. Together, these factors then justify 
permitting the physician to go beyond what other witnesses are 
permitted to do—to render opinions, and not just testimony based on 
personal knowledge, under Fed. R. Evid. 703 and Daubert120 or 
Frye,121 depending on the jurisdiction. 
Hence, the SPR proclaims that “[t]he diagnosis of AHT is a 
medical diagnosis made by a multidisciplinary team of pediatricians and 
pediatric subspecialty physicians, social workers and other 
professionals based on consideration of all the facts and evidence.”122 
The “other professionals” mentioned in this sentence are typically 
police and prosecutors, although the SPR statement chooses not to 
make that explicit. The SPR elaborates that “[a] diagnosis of AHT is a 
medical conclusion, not a legal determination of the intent of the 
perpetrator or, in the false hyperbole of the courtroom and 
sensationalistic media, ‘a diagnosis of murder.’”123 Later, the SPR 
devotes an entire subsection to the topic under the heading, “AHT is a 
medical diagnosis not a legal finding of murder.”124 
The SPR statement’s argument for this claim is that “[t]he medical 
expert in a child abuse case plays just one role—to help the judge or 
jury answer the medical question of whether an infant’s injuries were 
most likely caused by abuse or they could be plausibly explained by a 
recognized disease or by one or more of the myriad hypothetical 
alternative causal explanations typically proffered by the defense.”125  
The statement reasons: 
It is absurd to argue that a medical diagnosis proves murder. 
Medical expert testimony on the etiology of the injury cannot 
answer the two foundational legal questions of actus reus 
(Latin for guilty act) or mens rea (Latin for guilty mind). That 
is because, even after the factfinder decides that the medical 
evidence supports a finding that an infant’s injuries were 
inflicted, non-medical evidence is required to determine who 
119.  See id. at 4–6, 11.
120.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
121.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
122. Choudhary et al., supra note 10, at 1049 (emphasis added).
123.  Id. (emphasis added).
124.  Id. at 1059 (emphasis added).
125.  Id. (emphasis in original).
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committed the act and to determine the level of intent (e.g., 
knowing, reckless or negligent).126 
The statement elaborates: 
To cite an analogous example that disproves the argument’s 
premise, the toxicologist who testifies that the victim was 
poisoned does not diagnose murder because the court must 
still decide the actus reus (how was the poison ingested?) and 
the mens rea (was the victim’s poisoning accidental, 
negligent, reckless or intentional?).127 
B. Foundational Question—Is the Conclusion of SBS/AHT Even a
“Diagnosis” as that Term is Used in Medicine? 
Before addressing the claim that the SBS/AHT conclusion is not in 
any way a legal matter, we note that the SPR’s claims present a 
foundational question—is the abuse determination a medical 
“diagnosis”? The SPR certainly claims as much, but the use of the term 
“diagnosis” is wrong, for these cases do not involve a medical 
diagnosis in the true sense.128 Rather, they involve a causation inquiry 
that goes beyond diagnosis, and ventures into etiology—a matter that in 
most contexts, including these, exceeds the training and expertise of 
clinical physicians.129 As generally used in medicine, diagnosis refers to 
the process of determining the disease or dysfunctional condition from 
which a patient suffers in order to determine the best course of 
126.  Id. (emphasis in original).
127.  Id. (emphasis in original).
128. Note that, even if AHT/SBS were truly a medical diagnosis, at least
according to physicians, that would not resolve the problem with opinion evidence in 
court on those matters. The Rules of Evidence, and not the role-inflating claims of 
some physicians themselves, determine the scope of admissible expert opinion 
evidence. That the determination of abuse is not a true medical diagnosis merely adds at 
a foundational level to the problems with the expert opinion evidence being propounded 
by child abuse physicians in SBS/AHT cases. We take up this matter in the next section 
of this Article. 
129. The authors of the “consensus” piece characterize AHT as a “diagnosis” 
thirty-seven times but recognize its fundamental nature as an etiology seven times in 
their text. Choudhary et al., supra note 10, at 1048–52, 1054–55, 1057–60. Consider 
this, from their abstract: “A multidisciplinary team bases this diagnosis on history, 
physical examination, imaging and laboratory findings. Because the etiology of the 
injury is multifactorial (shaking, shaking and impact, impact, etc.) the current best and 
inclusive term is AHT.” Id. at 1049. 
This is an interesting ploy, using what is essentially word magic to capture the 
benefits of the diagnostic function as a presumptive part of medical training and 
expertise, but at the same time asserting that etiological inference (or conjecture) 
without benefit of empirical research is a legitimate part of “diagnosis.” 
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treatment to cure or relieve the disease or condition.130 The disease or 
condition is inferred from signs, symptoms, risk factors, and the results 
of diagnostic tests. Signs are objective conditions or manifestations 
observed by the physician either directly or with the aid of sense-
enhancing instruments such as a stethoscope. Symptoms are subjective 
reports of pain, weakness, or other conditions associated with the 
complaint of the patient in regard to a dysfunctional condition or 
disease. Risk factors (beyond those represented directly by signs or 
symptoms) are such things as family history of disease, exposure to 
disease-causing agents, etc., which are usually derived from the 
patient’s history as recounted by the patient (or next of kin), or derived 
from the patient’s previous medical records. To be appropriately 
considered in diagnosis, risk factors must have been established as 
being such by previous empirical research.131 Finally, diagnostic tests, 
which are often the result of microscopic or chemical analysis of bodily 
fluids or tissues or microorganism cultures derived from the body of the 
patient, give results correlated by previous research with certain 
diseases or conditions. They are usually performed by someone other 
than the treating physician and are often now instrumented to a greater 
or lesser degree. 
One thing to note at the outset is that diagnosis is not directly 
concerned with the cause of a disease or condition, although some 
diagnoses will entail causes established by previous research, and some 
diagnostic tests will reveal the presence of a causal agent associated 
with the condition by previous research. The point is that diagnostic 
judgment itself does not address causation independent of previous 
research on the cause of a disease or constellation of signs and 
symptoms.132 
Here we must be clear on the sense in which we are using the term 
“cause.” It is not uncommon to say that when a particular disease has 
been identified as the source of a person’s signs and symptoms, the 
diagnosis has identified the “cause” of those signs and symptoms. In a 
non-technical and extended sense this is not incorrect, but not in the 
sense covered by the concept of etiology, which deals with the question 
of what original conditions cause the disease itself. Malaria provides a 
helpful example.133 For centuries malaria was easily diagnosed in 
130. Findley & Risinger, supra note 64, at 1219.
131.  Id.
132.  See Anthony G. Hopp, Jeremy S. Goldkind & David M. Cummings,
Differential Diagnosis and Daubert: Preventing the Misuse of Differential Etiology to 
Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 84 DEF. COUNS. J. 1, 6 (2017). 
133.  Many other such stories from the great age of the identification of
infectious microorganisms that were the cause of well-known diseases could be set out 
here, such as cholera, tuberculosis, etc. See Malaria, WIKIPEDIA.COM, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaria [https://perma.cc/6FYQ-XLPM]. 
1240 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
typical cases involving malarial paroxysm—shaking chills alternating 
with high fever and sweats over a two- or three-day cycle. However, 
the cause, in any useful sense, was unknown (the very name indicates 
the cause was assigned to “bad air.”) Identifying the cause of malaria in 
detail is a triumph of modern medical research, beginning in 1880 with 
Laveran’s observation of parasites in the blood of infected individuals, 
and continuing in the subsequent decades as the different species of 
Plasmodium responsible for the variations of the disease, and the role 
of mosquitos in spreading the infection was worked out in detail.134 So a 
physician in 1875 could diagnose the disease, and even treat some cases 
fairly well with quinine, but had no well-warranted idea of the cause of 
the disease itself—its etiology. 
Pneumonia provides another useful example. The symptoms and 
signs of pneumonia can include cough, shortness of breath, fever and 
abnormal lung sounds. A clinician may order diagnostic tests including 
bloodwork, culture, X-ray or sometimes a CT exam. The diagnosis is 
based on all of these clinical signs and symptoms as well as diagnostic 
testing. But the particular etiology of that pneumonia need not be 
identified to treat the patient (and few physicians would claim to be able 
to “diagnose” how a particular pneumonia developed in any one 
patient). Regardless of cause, the treatment would be for the illness—
typically a broad-spectrum antibiotic.  And that is as far as the 
causation inquiry would go; the physician would not venture into 
“diagnosing” how or what introduced that organism into the body. 
Child abuse physicians, by contrast, take that one extra step—by 
analogy to the pneumonia case, they assume they know how the patient 
acquired the pneumonia. 
The iterative process known as differential diagnosis also is not 
designed to address etiology. “Differential diagnosis refers to the 
process whereby the physician ideally determines a wide range of 
diseases or conditions that might account for a set of signs and 
symptoms, rank orders them by probability (or sometimes severity), 
and proceeds to attempt to rule out the members of the list by further 
tests.”135  
In practice, whether one actually rules out of every possibility 
except one will depend on the remoteness of initial 
probabilities and the availability and expense of diagnostic 
tests . . . [O]ften the most life-threatening or the most 
probable disease after convenient diagnostic testing has been 
done will be treated first . . . [O]nly when treatment fails will 
that disease be eliminated and either further more rigorous or 
134.  Id. See the history section of the Wikipedia article on malaria.
135. Findley & Risinger, supra note 64, at 1220.
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costly testing, or treatment for the next most likely disease, be 
undertaken. Note that differential diagnosis involves a 
feedback loop where initial diagnostic hypotheses are 
modified in light of newly acquired information. And most 
importantly, skill in differential diagnosis (or diagnosis 
generally) does not provide one with special skill in 
determining causation in regard to the disease or condition 
finally settled on and treated successfully. The skill is in 
determining the disease or condition in the patient, and 
knowing how to treat it successfully, not in determining its 
cause. Determining cause (the “etiology” of a disease) is a 
specialty of scientific medical research, not of practical 
diagnosis by practicing physicians.136   
Of course, once such etiology has been established by well-
designed medical research, it may become a part of the process of 
diagnosis. This applies both to the testing for known pathogens as part 
of diagnosis (illustrated above in the pneumonia example), as well as 
discovering exposure to previously established risk factors. 
Of course, practicing physicians may be willing to opine on the 
causation of conditions like various cancers that have not yet been 
established by research, and they may invoke their diagnostic skills in 
the process, but this is misplaced; determining the etiology of a disease 
that has not yet been established by formal research is beyond the scope 
of the practitioner’s training and expertise and represents no more than 
a conjectural hypothesis at best.137 There is no training, formal or 
otherwise, in the practice of “differential etiology” in medical school. 
136.  Id. (footnote omitted).
137.  Id. at 1220–21. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit explained in the course of holding that it was error to permit a physician to 
opine that a specific slip-and-fall accident was the cause of the plaintiff’s fibromyalgia 
(a nonspecific, chronic-pain illness): 
The court’s task was to determine whether Dr. Reyna’s methodology tied 
the fall at Food Lion by some specific train of medical evidence to Black’s 
development of fibromyalgia. No one doubts the utility of medical histories 
in general or the process by which doctors rule out some known causes of 
disease in order to finalize a diagnosis. But such general rules must, under 
Daubert, Kumho Tire, and Moore, be applied fact-specifically in each case. 
The underlying predicates of any cause-and-effect medical testimony are 
that medical science understands the physiological process by which a 
particular disease or syndrome develops and knows what factors cause the 
process to occur. . . . In this case, neither Dr. Reyna nor medical science 
knows the exact process that results in fibromyalgia or the factors that 
trigger the process. Absent these critical scientific predicates, . . . no 
scientifically reliable conclusion on causation can be drawn. 
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Indeed, in civil cases, courts have recognized the important 
distinction between differential etiology and differential diagnosis, and 
that the former is a much more dubious proposition.138 The difference is 
significant.139 The differential diagnosis, as a rule, “does not provide an 
adequate basis for establishing external causation.”140 Rather, the 
differential diagnosis “focus[es] on diagnosing the disease, not on 
determining the etiology or cause of the disease.”141 “[D]ifferential 
etiology,” by contrast, “describe[s] the investigation and reasoning that 
leads to the determination of external causation, sometimes more 
specifically described by the witness or court as a process of identifying 
external causes by a process of elimination.”142 As one civil court put it 
bluntly, “[t]he differential diagnosis method has an inherent reliability; 
the differential etiology method does not.”143 
To understand why, consider Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp.144 The 
case was a tort action by a railroad employee against his employer, 
seeking damages for injuries he claimed he sustained from the 
vibrations of the train on which he worked.145 The court held that the 
differential diagnosis could be used to determine the nature of the 
plaintiff’s medical condition. But determining that the locomotive’s 
vibrations were the cause-in-fact of those injuries was another matter, 
beyond the scope of the differential diagnosis and the physician’s 
expertise.146 The court noted that, when diagnosing a patient for 
treatment purposes, the doctor has special incentives that provide 
Black v. Food Lion, 171 F.3d 308, 314 (5th Cir. 1999). It is widely recognized that the 
pathophysiology of SBS/AHT, like the pathophysiology of fibromyalgia, is not well 
understood. See supra notes 27 and 40 and accompanying text. 
138.  See, e.g., Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1360–61
(M.D. Ga. 2007), aff’d, 300 F. App’x 700 (11th Cir. 2008); Hendrix ex rel. v. Evenflo 
Co., Inc., 609 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2010); C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 
F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2015); Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 673 (6th Cir.
2010); Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp., 794 F.3d 697, 705 (7th Cir. 2015); Myers v.
Illinois Central R.R., 629 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2010); see also TUERKHEIMER, supra
note 46, at 75.
139.  The discussion of this issue that follows is adapted from Keith A.
Findley, Flawed Science and the New Wave of Innocents, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
AND THE DNA REVOLUTION 184, 190–93 (Daniel S. Medwed, ed. 2017). 
140.  TUERKHEIMER, supra note 46, at 76; see also Hopp, supra note 127, at 6.
141.  Id.
142.  McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1252 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Mary Sue Henifin, et al., Reference Guide on Medical Testimony, in 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 439, 481 (Federal Judicial Center 2d 
ed., 2000)). 
143.  Bowers, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1361; see also TUERKHEIMER, supra note 46,
at 76; Findley, supra note 139, at 191.  
144.  Bowers, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1343.
145.  Id. at 1344–45.
146.  Id. at 1362.
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assurances of accuracy: misdiagnosis can lead to catastrophic illness for 
the patient, even death, from failure to prescribe the correct 
treatment.147 And that error can in turn lead to medical malpractice 
liability.148 When a physician opines that a train worker’s physical 
injuries were caused specifically by the train’s vibrations, or that a 
child’s brain injuries were caused by abuse, however, she is not 
diagnosing the patient for treatment purposes. In the SBS/AHT case, 
the diagnosis is brain injury, and it is that injury that is treated. 
Whether an injury was inflicted or sustained accidentally has no bearing 
on the way a patient is treated medically. 
This reality has other implications undermining the reliability of 
the differential etiology. The true differential diagnosis—diagnosing a 
patient’s medical illness or condition for purposes of prescribing 
treatment—at least has the potential for enabling the doctor to learn 
from experience, and thus improves reliability. If the doctor 
misdiagnoses an illness or condition, the treatment will likely fail, and 
the doctor will adjust the diagnosis and the treatment accordingly. But 
because there is no similar treatment feedback loop to differentiate 
between abusive and non-abusive injuries, judgments about causation 
(etiology) do not offer similar opportunities for learning and for 
ensuring experience-based reliability. 
Medical professionals have recognized this challenge even in the 
context of true diagnosis. Eta Berner and Mark Graber, for example, 
have observed that, where feedback is absent or minimal, 
overconfidence by the physician can be a significant source of 
diagnostic error: “[F]eedback that is delayed or absent may not be 
recognized for what it is, and the perception that ‘misdiagnosis is not a 
big problem’ remains unchallenged. That is, in the absence of 
information that the diagnosis is wrong, it is assumed to be correct . . . 
.”149 And Gordon Schiff has explained how the absence of feedback can 
undermine reliability, even in the true diagnosis context: 
An open-loop system (also called a “nonfeedback controlled” 
system) is one that makes decisions based solely on 
preprogrammed criteria and the preexisting model of the 
system. This approach does not use feedback to calibrate its 
147.  Id. at 1361.
148.  Id.
149.  Eta S. Berner & Mark L. Graber, Overconfidence as a Cause of
Diagnostic Error in Medicine, 121 AM. J. MED. S2, S10 (2008).  
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output or determine if the desired goal is achieved. . . . [Such 
a system] cannot engage in learning.150 
Because opining about the etiology of a child’s brain findings 
provides no feedback mechanism, the entire enterprise is untethered 
from empirical confirmation. Without the feedback required to “engage 
in learning,” the expert’s opinions based on clinical judgment can 
amount to little more than ipse dixit, which the Supreme Court has 
recognized as problematic under the Federal Rules of Evidence.151 
As problematic as the causation determination can be in tort cases, 
that determination, employing a differential etiology methodology, is 
even more challenging in SBS/AHT cases. The reason is simple. In the 
typical tort case, the question posed to the expert is whether a known 
historical fact connects causally to a known injury or outcome. But in 
SBS/AHT cases, the historical fact at issue—whether the accused 
violently shook or shook and slammed the child—is itself unproven and 
unknown. In the SBS/AHT context, the expert is asked to relate cause 
to effect when only the effect has been observed; it asks the expert to 
divine not only the relationship between the precipitating event and the 
outcome, but to divine even the existence of the alleged precipitating 
event itself, which has not been observed or otherwise proven. 
In the Bowers scenario, for example, the train engineer in fact 
suffered the injuries of which he complained, and he was in fact 
exposed to the vibrations that he claimed caused those injuries. 
Similarly, in a toxic tort case, typically there is no dispute that the 
plaintiff in fact contracted cancer, or was born with birth defects, and 
that the plaintiff was in fact exposed to the toxins or carcinogens. The 
question for the expert in either scenario is whether the known 
exposure caused the known outcome. Nonetheless, that is the type of 
causation claim that Douglas Weed observes is so difficult to make, 
because it “does not have [the] sort of connection back to some unique 
event that can be documented, verified, and directly observed.”152 
But in SBS/AHT cases, the expert’s opinion is needed precisely 
because the existence of the act of shaking or abusing the child is 
otherwise not established. The children in such cases cannot describe 
what happened, because they are either pre-verbal or deceased (or 
both). The medical expert must not only infer that shaking caused the 
150.  Gordon D. Schiff, Minimizing Diagnostic Error: The Importance of
Follow-up and Feedback, 121 AM. J. MED. S38, S38 (2008). 
151.  See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“But nothing in
either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit 
opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the 
expert.”). 
152.  Douglas L. Weed, Truth, Epidemiology, and General Causation, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 943, 949 (2008). 
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child’s injuries, but that the shaking even occurred in the first instance. 
As a category of cases, therefore, SBS/AHT cases present in stark form 
the tensions that lie at the interface between law and science. 
In other words, at least in civil cases the clinical practitioner’s 
musings about etiology generally concern hypotheses about causal 
mechanisms that, however much they have not been tested empirically, 
at least could in theory be tested empirically. The “abuse” conclusion 
entailed in AHT testimony involves conclusions about subjective mental 
states that are not subject to the protocols of medical research even in 
theory. In regard to such mental states, which are what define criminal 
responsibility legally, physicians and medical researchers are in no 
better position to make inferences from the factual circumstances 
surrounding a death than are ordinary human beings applying critical 
common sense. Such issues are reserved for the jury without opinions 
being offered by putative experts whose opinions are beyond the scope 
of their expertise, and invite inappropriate deference by jurors.153 
An instructive case dealing with what is essentially the same issue 
in the testimony offered by a forensic pathologist is State v. Tyler,154 a 
case decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa involving the sudden 
unexplained death of an infant. In that case the trial court had permitted 
the Medical Examiner to testify to his conclusion that the “manner of 
death” was homicide.155 The Iowa high court held that this was error 
because the conclusion was not a medical opinion based on specialized 
knowledge; it was instead a non-expert opinion based mostly on 
information derived from law enforcement investigators—information 
that the Medical Examiner’s medical expertise did not enable him to 
evaluate more reliably than the jury.156 As there, so here. 
Because the nature of the conclusions offered by physicians in 
court under the label Abusive Head Trauma do not involve diagnosis, 
and are in part conclusions about subjective mental states beyond the 
scope of medical etiology, we have generally referred to them in this 
paper simply as “AHT conclusions or determinations,” except where 
direct quotation or context necessitates the use of the term “diagnosis.” 
153. Judges often refer to such opinions variously as “invading the province of
the jury,” “outside the scope of the witnesses’ expertise and specialized knowledge,” 
“not beyond the ken of the average juror,” “not helpful to the jury,” and other such 
phrases. See, e.g., Kimble v. Earle M. Jorgenson Co., 830 N.E.2d 814, 823 (2005); 
Lee v. Andersen, 616 F.3d 803, 808–09 (8th Cir. 2010); Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
154. 867 N.W.2d 136 (Iowa 2015).
155.  Id. at 145–47.
156.  Id. at 163–64.
1246 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
C. The Legal Essence of the “Diagnosis”
By invoking “diagnosis,” the “consensus” document is using what 
is essentially word magic to capture the benefits of the diagnostic 
function as a presumptive part of medical training and expertise, but at 
the same time asserting that etiological inference (or conjecture) 
without benefit of empirical research is a legitimate part of “diagnosis.”  
But putting aside whether the definition of “diagnosis” can be stretched 
in some extended sense to cover AHT conclusions, it remains the case 
that most of the core AHT conclusions constitute legal characterizations 
and not objective scientific facts.  Despite the SPR’s claims that the 
SBS/AHT conclusion says nothing about legal matters like actus reus 
and mens rea or identity of the purported abuser, the very term 
“abusive head trauma,” or its alternative formulations in the medical 
literature, such as “non-accidental head injury” (NAHI), “inflicted 
traumatic brain injury” (ITBI), and the like, do precisely what the SPR 
says they do not do. To opine that the abuse was “inflicted”—whether 
by violent shaking or impacting the child’s head, or both, which are the 
inferred mechanisms of injury in AHT—adds nothing but the legal 
requirements of actus reus, mens rea, and even (albeit somewhat less 
directly) identity. 
First, to label the etiology as “inflicted” or “abusive” or “non-
accidental” serves precisely to opine as to the actus reus, the guilty act. 
The medical opinion purports to tell us precisely that which the law 
requires—what action did the accused take? While the medical 
hypothesis no longer claims to be able to specify whether the 
mechanism of injury was shaking or impact or both (hence the shift in 
the nomenclature from SBS to the more-inclusive AHT), it tells us all 
that the law requires to satisfy the actus reus requirement—that 
someone applied violent force to harm the child.157 
Second, the term “abusive head trauma” or any of its formulations 
also by their very nature satisfy the mens rea element of the crime of 
child abuse (or its variants). Child abuse statutes set the requisite 
mental state for criminal conduct at various levels, from intentional to 
reckless to negligent or knowing. Purely blameless accidental conduct 
is never criminal. The SPR statement contends that when a physician 
opines that “an infant’s injuries were inflicted,” he or she is not 
offering evidence about or diagnosing the mental state needed to 
157. In this regard, a very recent decision of the Georgia Supreme Court in an
abusive head trauma case is telling. In that case, the court observed that “the case 
against the [defendants] was entirely circumstantial, and the only evidence that a crime 
had been committed at all was the expert medical testimony of Dr. Darrisaw, the 
State’s medical expert who performed the autopsy.” Debelbot v. State, 826 S.E.2d 129, 
134 (Ga. 2019) (emphasis added). 
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establish a crime.158 But then what exactly are the conclusions that the 
injuries were “inflicted” and were “abusive” doing? Their only 
purpose, in addition to establishing the actus reus, is to prove the 
mental state of the alleged abuser; they serve no other purpose, medical 
or otherwise. These are quintessentially legal questions, not medical 
questions;159 they have no medical implications at all, since there is no 
difference in treatment for the brain injuries a child suffers depending 
on whether any trauma the child suffered was applied intentionally 
(inflicted) or accidentally. But this does answer the mens rea question: 
if the injury is inflicted or the result of abuse, then the caregiver acted 
not accidentally, but with a guilty mind. And the only consequences of 
this determination are solely legal: if the injury is inflicted, the child 
might be removed from the parents, or the caregivers might be 
prosecuted criminally. 
Elsewhere, the child abuse literature written by strong proponents 
of the SBS/AHT hypothesis confirms that doctors, including child 
abuse pediatricians, realize how the “diagnosis” resolves legal 
questions. Indeed, previously the SPR’s own ad hoc Committee on 
Child Abuse, in 2005, acknowledged in writing that “[t]he testimony of 
pediatric radiologists can be crucial in the differentiation of child abuse 
from accidental fractures, metabolic diseases, and other bone disorders. 
In cases where child abuse is suspected, a physician’s opinion will often 
be determinative.”160 Likewise, child abuse pediatrician John Leventhal 
at Yale notes that, when evaluating a child for suspected abuse, the 
physician must consider what he calls “[t]wo important questions”: 
“First, are the child’s findings due to trauma or a medical problem (or 
a combination of the two)? Second, if trauma, are the injuries due to 
abuse as opposed to neglect, an unintentional (or accidental) cause or 
birth trauma?”161 
158. Choudhary et al., supra note 10, at 1059.
159. In this regard, the observations of a team of medical and scientific experts
appointed by the Swedish government to investigate the scientific foundations for the 
SBS hypothesis are apt: 
The term [SBS], however, is problematic as it includes both the medical 
findings and the alleged, but scientifically unproven, injurious mechanism—
and even the intent behind this mechanism. 
Hence, we ought to differ between the injurious mechanism (traumatic 
shaking) and the medical findings (the symptoms and signs, “the triad”). 
Intent is not, for obvious reasons, for the medical community to decide. 
Niels LynØe, Niklas Juth, & Anders Eriksson, From Child Protection to Paradigm 
Protection—The Genesis, Development, and Defense of a Scientific Paradigm, J. MED.
& PHIL. 378, 379 (2019) (emphasis in original). 
160.  Kenneth L. Mendelson, Critical Review of “Temporary Brittle Bone
Disease,” 35 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 1036, 1036 (2005). 
161.  See Leventhal et al., supra note 50, at S537 (emphasis added).
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Finally, it is misleading, at best, to suggest that the medical 
opinion does not address identity; in the typical case, the medical 
opinion provides all the prosecutor needs to prove identity of the 
perpetrator. As the SPR statement itself asserts, most prosecution 
experts reject the notion that a child so injured would have any 
extended period of lucidity after injury.162 Hence, the medical opinion 
purports to establish that the person with the child at or very near the 
time of collapse or onset of major symptoms must have been the one 
who harmed the child.163 In this regard, Dr. Leventhal’s writings again 
reveal that the “diagnosis” is ultimately a conclusion about a legal 
question. Leventhal highlights the importance of timing the child’s 
injuries, observing, “[a]n understanding of the timing of the injury can 
help answer the question of who hurt the child, which, in turn, affects 
whether an alleged perpetrator will be arrested and prosecuted.”164 
162. Choudhary et al., supra note 10, at 1052 (“There is no evidence that
children with fatal head trauma have prolonged asymptomatic lucid intervals prior to 
neurologic collapse.”). This assertion, however, is misleading at best, and flat-out 
wrong at worst. There is in fact considerable evidence in the literature that children 
with fatal brain injuries can have prolonged periods of lucidity prior to collapse, 
ranging from minutes to hours or even days. See M.G.F. Gilliland, Interval Duration 
Between Injury and Severe Symptoms in Nonaccidental Head Trauma in Infants and 
Young Children, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI. 723 (1998) (reporting extensive lucid intervals in 
some cases, including some of more than seventy-two hours); Robert W. Huntington, 
III, Symptoms Following Head Injury, 23 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 105 
(2002) (reporting on a case in which an apparently abused thirteen-month-old child was 
admitted to the hospital and was under professional medical care and supervision for 
less than twenty-four hours before she collapsed and died, at which time physicians for 
the first time discovered severe intracranial injury, with subdural hemorrhage, retinal 
hemorrhage, and cerebral edema); Scott Denton & Darinka Mileusnic, Delayed Sudden 
Death in an Infant Following an Accidental Fall, 24 AMER. J. FORENSIC MED. &
PATHOLOGY 371 (2003) (case report of a nine-month-old child who experienced a 
seventy-two hour lucid interval). While it is true that the children in these 
circumstances usually are not wholly symptom-free, the symptoms can be subtle and 
difficult to discern in pre-verbal infants and toddlers—symptoms like clinginess, 
fussiness, vomiting, interrupted sleep or eating patterns, and the like. See Huntington, 
supra (explaining that physicians did not recognize the child’s severe intracranial 
injuries initially because she was “fussy and clingy, but interactive and responsive”); 
Gilliland, supra, at 724 (noting that during the periods of lucidity the children were 
described as “not normal”). Children are not always immediately comatose or 
unresponsive, as child abuse pediatricians have typically claimed in the past. 
163. For discussion of the use of the no-lucid-intervals claim to prove identity,
see Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome and the 
Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 5, 18 (2011) (noting “[u]nequivocal 
testimony regarding timing—i.e., that symptoms necessarily would appear 
instantaneously upon the infliction of injury—proves the perpetrator’s identity”); 
Findley et al., supra note 3, at 225–26 (noting testimony claiming “there could be no 
period of relative normality (‘lucid interval’) following the injury. It was therefore 
widely accepted that the last person with the baby must have been responsible.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
164. Leventhal et al., supra note 50, at S537 (emphasis added).
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Leventhal reiterates that “[i]t is useful to know who was present when 
the child became symptomatic, especially if the symptoms occurred 
rapidly and during a short period of time. This information can help 
determine who may have hurt the child . . . .”165 
A recent decision from an Ohio appellate court exemplifies this 
problem with—and the all-encompassing nature of—the “medical 
diagnosis” of SBS/AHT. In reversing the accused’s conviction as being 
against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court observed that the 
prosecution’s child abuse pediatrician, Dr. Randall Schlievert, 
“examined E.A. on the night of the incident, and concluded not only 
that E.A. had suffered shaken baby syndrome, but that appellant was 
the perpetrator. Upon Schlievert’s conclusion, all criminal investigation 
into the cause of E.A.’s injuries stopped.”166 
Insight on this is further gleaned from the writings of Dr. Norman 
Guthkelch, one of the physicians credited with originating the SBS 
hypothesis in a paper written in 1971, although he did not call it that at 
the time.167 More than forty years later, reflecting on what had 
happened to his hypothesis in the intervening years, Dr. Guthkelch 
lamented that the claim to “diagnose” SBS and AHT reflects 
overreaching by the medical community: 
Since subdural and retinal hemorrhages (with or without 
cerebral edema) may also be observed in accidental or natural 
settings, I suggest that the elements of the classic triad of 
retinal hemorrhage, subdural hemorrhage and cerebral edema 
would be better defined in terms of their medical features. 
Since subdural hemorrhages in infancy originate in the dura, 
perhaps “retino-dural hemorrhage of infancy” would be an 
acceptable name for the primary findings. Other medical 
findings, e.g., cerebral edema, can be added to the title as 
appropriate. This would allow us to investigate causation 
without appearing to assume that we already know the 
answer.168 
Dr. Guthkelch further observed: “Tuerkheimer has pointed out the 
danger of assuming criminal intent simply because the classic triad of 
retino-dural hemorrhage and encephalopathy is present and no one can 
165.  Id. at S538.
166.  State v. Thoss, 120 N.E.3d 1274, 1283 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018).
167.  See A.N. Guthkelch, Infantile Subdural Haematoma and Its Relationship
to Whiplash Injuries, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 430 (1971). 
168.  Guthkelch, supra note 28, at 202 (emphasis added).
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think of any other explanation.”169 Accordingly, Dr. Guthkelch 
concluded, “[a]ny medical expert who answers in the negative 
questions such as ‘Given the injuries that you have described in this 
case, doctor, have you any doubt that they were inflicted with intent to 
kill, or at least in total disregard of that possibility?’ is exceeding his or 
her authority.”170 
If any question remains about the legal nature of the purported 
diagnosis, one need only look to the actual courtroom testimony of 
medical experts who testify on behalf of the prosecution in criminal and 
family cases. Routinely, these witnesses testify, for example, that the 
forces required to cause the injuries suffered by the child at issue had to 
have been so massive they could not have been accidental, often likened 
to the forces of an automobile accident at thirty miles per hour or more, 
or throwing a child from a multi-story building.171 (Indeed, a chapter by 
a prosecutor in a child-abuse textbook urged that physicians “can testify 
that the forces the child experiences [from shaking] are the equivalent 
169.  Id. at 203 (citing Deborah Tuerkheimer, Science-Dependent Prosecution
and the Problem of Epistemic Contingency: A Study of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 3 ALA.
L. REV. 523 (2011)).
170.  Guthkelch, supra note 28, at 204.
171.  See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 64 and cases cited therein (noting that
“[t]he most common analogies [used by prosecution experts] are to the amount [of 
force] generated by high speed automobile accidents and a fall from a several-story 
building). The experts analogize to these ‘real-life accident scenarios’ in order to give 
the trier of fact a sense of the ‘massive, violent’ force required to produce this kind of 
brain injury.” Cited cases include Mitchell v. State, No. CACR 07-472, 2008 WL 
316166, at *2 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2008) (examining pediatrician equated the force 
necessary to produce the triad with that of a high-speed automobile accident); People v. 
Dunaway, 88 P.3d 619, 631, 631–32 (Colo. 2004) (explaining how the prosecution 
expert stated that subdural hematomas occur in “such things as falling from a several 
story building or being in a high speed motorcycle accident or a child say is on a 
bicycle hit by a car . . . .[W]hen we see subdurals in accidental injury, it’s from a 
major trauma. It requires massive force”); In re Matter of Child, 880 N.Y.S. 2d 760, 
765 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2008) (explaining how the prosecution expert stated that SBS 
findings “simulate being in a car crash at ‘around [thirty-five] to [forty] miles per 
hour’”). See also Transcript of Testimony of Dr. Gregory Hollman at 78, State v. 
Edmunds, No. 96-CF-555 (Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. Nov. 21, 1996) (explaining that the 
forces required from shaking “would be [the equivalent of throwing a child from] right 
around a three story building, three to four story building”). See also Papetti et al., 
supra note 24, at 311 n.60 (collecting other cases in which physicians testified 
similarly). That testimony is also consistent with claims in the published medical 
literature of the early 2000s. See, e.g., Case et al., supra note 23, at 120 (“Fatal 
accidental shearing or diffuse brain injuries require such extremes of rotational force 
that they occur only in obvious incidents such as motor vehicle accidents. . . . [Or 
from] falling from considerable heights (greater than [ten] feet) or having some object 
penetrate the head.”); Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Child Abuse & Neglect, 
Shaken Baby Syndrome: Rotational Cranial Injuries—Technical Report, 108 
PEDIATRICS 206, 206 (2001) (position paper of the American Academy of Pediatrics 
proclaiming that “[t]he act of shaking is so violent that individuals observing it would 
recognize it as dangerous and likely to kill the child”). 
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of a fifty to sixty miles per hour unrestrained motor vehicle accident, or 
a fall from three to four stories onto a hard surface.”172) Routinely, 
therefore, child abuse physicians testify that anyone applying or 
observing those forces would have recognized that they would cause 
severe harm to the child.173 The 1993 position paper of the American 
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) even explicitly instructed pediatricians 
that “the act of shaking/slamming is so violent that competent 
individuals observing the shaking would recognize it as dangerous.”174 
The 2001 AAP position paper doubled down on that claim, adding that 
the forces would be “so violent that individuals observing it would 
recognize it as dangerous and likely to kill the child.”175 The forces 
could not have been accidental. The hypothesis and attendant testimony 
explicitly address mens rea.176 
Such claims, it turns out, are entirely unscientific and indeed 
wrong. There simply is no scientific research establishing that the brain 
injuries in these cases require such extreme forces. When pushed, even 
prosecution experts who make such claims have to admit that there is 
no science underlying these claims.177 One need only pause and think 
about it for a moment to intuit the preposterousness of a claim that a 
single human being can manually generate forces equivalent to a thirty 
to sixty miles per hour unrestrained automobile crash or a multistory 
fall. And the biomechanical research confirms what intuition tells us—
both that the most violent shaking cannot generate forces anywhere 
close to those described by the child abuse physicians, and that serious 
brain injuries can in fact be caused by much less obviously fatal forces, 
172.  Holmgren, supra note 44, at 307.
173.  See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
174. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Child Abuse & Neglect, Shaken
Baby Syndrome: Inflicted Cerebral Trauma, 92 PEDIATRICS 872, 872 (1993). 
175. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Child Abuse & Neglect, supra note
171, at 206 (emphasis added). 
176.  Holmgren, supra note 44, at 307 (child abuse prosecutor urging that such
testimony helps prove “the mens rea requirements for the charge”). 
177. For example, Dr. Jeffrey Jentzen, testifying for the prosecution in a
Wisconsin courtroom, testified as follows: 
Q. Now, there is really no scientific basis, however, for saying that’s
the amount of force it takes [e.g. the equivalent of a motor vehicle accident
or multi-story fall], is there?
A. No. Other than the fact we see that type of injury and those kind of
injuries.
Q. So sort of anecdotal, observational, cumulative kind of experience
kind of thing?
A. Yes. Along with interview questionnaires with individuals who have
been involved in those kind of events.
Transcript of Testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Jentzen at Evidentiary Hearing at 30, State v. 
Edmunds, No. 96-CF-555 (Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. Feb. 22, 2007). 
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such as those from falls of just several feet.178 Regardless, the point 
remains that by making such (unscientific) claims, physicians are 
attempting to do nothing more than answer the actus reus and mens rea 
questions, questions that are beyond their role as physicians bringing 
specialized scientific knowledge to bear on issues within the scope of 
their special expertise. 
Thus, it is far from “the false hyperbole of the courtroom and 
sensationalistic media”179 to understand SBS/AHT as a “medical 
diagnosis of murder.” It is, instead, an accurate understanding of the 
nature and import of the opinions rendered by child abuse pediatricians 
who claim they can divine what external forces were applied to a child 
by a human actor, with what state of mind, and when (leading to 
identifying the perpetrator). When proffered to “diagnose” “abuse,” the 
medical expert’s testimony often does indeed satisfy all of the elements 
of the case: what happened, who did it, and with what state of mind? 
Moreover, it was not even lawyers in the courtroom, or the 
“sensationalistic media,” that first likened SBS to a medical diagnosis 
of murder. It was, instead, a serious scholar and professor of law, 
Deborah Tuerkheimer, then at DePaul University College of Law, now 
at Northwestern University School of Law, herself once a child abuse 
prosecutor in New York, who dispassionately reviewed the medical and 
legal literature on the subject and first recognized that physicians were 
being called upon to decide legal questions in the guise of rendering 
medical opinions; it was she who labeled SBS a “medical diagnosis of 
murder.”180 Thus, that likening did not originate in the “sensationalistic 
media,” but in respected law journals181 and a book published by 
Oxford University Press.182 The media has indeed reported on the 
rupturing controversies in this field, but that media coverage has hardly 
been of the tabloid variety. The most hard-hitting coverage, and hence 
the coverage that prosecutors and child-abuse pediatricians typically rail 
against, has included extensive pieces in the New York Times,183 the 
178.  See, e.g., Duhaime et al., supra note 31; Prange et al., supra note 31;
Ommaya et al., supra note 33, at 226; Werner Goldsmith & John Plunkett, A 
Biomechanical Analysis of the Causes of Traumatic Brain Injury in Infants and 
Children, 25 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 89 (2004). 
179.  Choudhary, supra note 10, at 1049.
180.  See Tuerkheimer, supra note 163, at 5; Tuekheimer, supra note 169, at
515–16. 
181. See sources cited supra note 180.
182.  TUERKHEIMER, supra note 46.
183. Emily Bazelon, Shaken-Baby Syndrome Faces New Questions in Court,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/magazine/06baby-
t.html?scp=1&sq=emily%20bazelon%20shaken&st=cse [https://perma.cc/J2X3-
M4KF]; Clyde Haberman, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Diagnosis That Divides the 
Medical World, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2015), 
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Washington Post,184 the American Bar Association Journal,185 and 
National Public Radio and Pro Publica,186 among others. We leave it to 
the reader to decide for herself if this is the “sensationalistic media” to 
which the SPR refers. 
Finally, although it should be obvious to even a casual reader by 
now, we note that the SPR’s analogy to a physician’s diagnosis that 
death was caused by poisoning is inapt. In the poisoning analogy, it is 
true that the physician only offers medical evidence about the subject’s 
physical conditions and the chemicals found in the body that caused 
death. The physician says nothing about the conduct of any outside 
actor—she addresses neither the actus reus nor the mens rea of any 
third party, nor the identity of anyone as the poisoner. For it is 
absolutely true in that scenario that the poison could have been ingested 
accidentally or suicidally, as well as homicidally. And even if a third 
party gave the victim the poison, the physician tells us nothing about 
the state of mind of that third person. But the “diagnosis” of SBS or 
AHT does much more than that—it tells us everything we need to know 
not only about the medical conditions that led to death, but also that 
some third party inflicted deadly trauma, and did so with such force 
that it could not have been accidental, and at a time when the accused 
had to have been present. The poisoning scenario would be analogous 
to SBS/AHT only if the physician purported to diagnose not just 
poisoning, but “inflicted” poisoning or “abusive” poisoning, by a 
person who was with the deceased at the time of death. The poisoning 
analogy lays bare the logical flaw in the SPR argument; indeed, it 
makes clear how the SBS/AHT “diagnosis” is different, and involves 
legal rather than medical conclusions. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/14/us/shaken-baby-syndrome-a-diagnosis-that-
divides-the-medical-world.html [https://perma.cc/9DDH-VSHP]. 
184.  Debbie Cenziper, Shaken Science: A Disputed Diagnosis Imprisons
Parents, WASH. POST (March 20, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/shaken-baby-
syndrome/?noredirect=on (multi-part series). 
185.  Mark Hansen, Unsettling Science: Experts Are Still Debating Whether
Shaken Baby Syndrome Exists, A.B.A.J., Dec. 2011, at 49–55. 
186.  Joseph Shapiro, Rethinking Shaken Baby Syndrome, NPR (June 29, 2011,
12:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2011/06/29/137471992/rethinking-shaken-baby-
syndrome [https://perma.cc/EY4H-2BER]. 
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTROVERSIES AND LEGAL NATURE OF
THE SBS/AHT CONCLUSIONS 
A. The Significance of the Legal Nature of the SBS/AHT Conclusion
The dispute about whether SBS or AHT is a medical diagnosis or a
legal determination is more than just a dispute about semantics or 
taxonomy. It matters for purposes of determining what the courts will 
do with such opinions. If it is a legal determination, courts cannot just 
defer to the physicians. Instead, courts must decide whether it is even 
permissible and appropriate for physicians to offer opinions about legal 
determinations that go beyond their medical training and expertise. 
1. THE LIMITATIONS OF MEDICAL EXPERTISE IN A LEGAL CONTEXT
The law explicitly recognizes that determining whether a caregiver
“has physically abused a child is a legal determination to be made by 
the factfinder”—that is, the judge or jury.187 The American Law 
Institute (ALI), in its newly adopted Restatement on Children and the 
Law, states, therefore, that the role of the expert witness is not to make 
such determinations, but is instead limited to “diagnos[ing] the child’s 
medical conditions, including for example, broken bones, bruising, 
internal bleeding, and swelling, as well as the medical consequences of 
those conditions for the child.”188 The ALI defines the limits of the 
expert’s authority in this way: 
In addition to allowing a medical expert to render opinions 
regarding diagnoses of the child’s bodily condition, a court 
may also allow a medical expert to render opinions regarding 
the external forces that may have caused the child’s 
conditions. A medical expert may testify, for example, about 
whether a child’s injuries are consistent with a parent’s 
testimony that the child was injured while playing or whether 
the injuries are consistent with blunt force trauma inflicted by 
the parent. Determinations regarding the external forces that 
may have caused the child’s condition exceed the scope of a 
diagnostic determination, however, and therefore the court 
must separately ascertain that the medical expert has 
187.  RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 3.20 (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 1, Apr. 6, 2018). 
188.  Id.
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appropriate expertise to render an opinion on such issues and 
that the opinion is adequately grounded in science.189 
Recently, a Michigan appellate court recognized this limitation in 
an SBS/AHT case. The court held: 
Notwithstanding the propriety of a diagnosis of inflicted 
trauma, we conclude that in cases involving allegations of 
abuse, an expert goes too far when he or she diagnoses the 
injury as “abusive head trauma“ or opines that the inflicted 
trauma amounted to child abuse. The ordinary understanding 
of the term “abuse”—as opposed to neglect or carelessness—
implies a level of willfulness and moral culpability that 
implicates the defendant’s intent or knowledge when 
performing the act that caused the head trauma. An expert 
may not offer an opinion on the intent or criminal 
responsibility of the accused.190 
Current practice among child-abuse physicians routinely runs afoul 
of this limitation, as does the SPR’s attempt to claim diagnosing abuse 
as a purely medical determination. 
The error can be understood by considering other forensic 
disciplines that have run into trouble because analysts have testified to 
statistical probabilities that lack a scientific foundation, or worse, to 
near or even absolute certainty about the match of crime scene evidence 
to a suspect—often in the guise of offering conclusions “to a reasonable 
degree of scientific certainty.” In its 2009 report on forensic sciences, 
189.  Id. The Reporter’s Comment elaborates:
In both criminal and civil child-protection proceedings, courts often allow 
medical experts to testify to their conclusion that physical abuse has 
occurred. See, e.g., People v. Weeks, 369 P.3d 699 (Col. App. 2015) (a 
medical expert may express a medical opinion that the child’s injuries were 
caused by intentional child abuse “so long as (1) he or she does not give an 
opinion on whether or not the defendant inflicted the injuries or whether the 
injuries fit the legal definition of child abuse and (2) the jury is properly 
instructed that it may accept or reject the opinion.”). This Section adopts a 
more constrained role for medical expert testimony, limiting it to the child’s 
diagnoses, the effects of the diagnoses for the child, and, where reliable, the 
medical expert’s opinion of the external forces believed responsible for the 
child’s diagnoses. The conclusion that the child’s diagnoses were the result 
of abuse is a decision that should be left solely to the trier of fact.  
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
190.  People v. McFarlane, 926 N.W.2d 339, 350 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018).
Despite this holding, the court in McFarlane also suggested that physicians may opine 
that a child’s injuries were “inflicted.” Id. This part of the decision makes little sense, 
however, because calling an injury “inflicted” is effectively equivalent to calling it 
“abusive.” 
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the National Academy of Sciences identified such scientifically baseless 
claims—claiming certainty or high statistical likelihoods when there was 
no basis for either—as a serious problem with forensic expertise in the 
courtroom.191 
As a stark example of this type of error, in 2015, the FBI, working 
in collaboration with the Innocence Project and the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, examined the testimony of 
its microscopic hair examiners in 268 cases from several decades prior 
to 2000, finding that the analysts had testified in scientifically erroneous 
or unsupportable ways in ninety-five percent of those cases.192 The 
problem? Primarily, the analysts tended to make statistical or certainty 
claims that had no scientific basis, such as claiming that they had 
examined 10,000 hairs and had never found one like the one at issue, or 
even giving specific astronomical odds of error, when no research 
supported those statistics.193 
Yet in child abuse cases, that is precisely the type of unscientific 
certainty or odds claim that physicians make routinely—and that the 
SPR so vehemently defends as a matter of medical diagnosis. But there 
simply is no basis for “diagnosing” abuse to the exclusion of all other 
causes of a child’s condition based on brain and eye findings, with or 
without other medical findings. Dr. Kent Hymel and a team of leading 
AHT/SBS proponents have acknowledged that “[g]old standard 
definitional criteria for AHT do not exist.”194  They add that “in the 
absence of a gold standard, clinicians can rarely confirm or exclude 
AHT with complete certainty and are compelled instead to adopt a 
probabilistic approach to the diagnosis.”195 All knowledgeable child 
abuse physicians today agree that there is no established diagnostic 
standard, and that the diagnosis is made upon the basis of a variety of 
findings, each of which may or may not be present in any given case.196 
In the end, they contend, it comes down to clinical judgment.197 It 
191.  NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN
THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 47, 184, 186 (2009). 
192.  Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits Flaws in Hair Analysis over Decades,
WASH. POST (April 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-
overstated-forensic-hair-matches-in-nearly-all-criminal-trials-for-
decades/2015/04/18/39c8d8c6-e515-11e4-b510-
962fcfabc310_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.47a948574cd9. 
193.  Spencer S. Hsu, Convicted Defendants Left Uninformed of Forensic
Flaws Found by Justice Dept., WASH. POST (April 16, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/convicted-defendants-left-uninformed-of-
forensic-flaws-found-by-justice-dept/2012/04/16/gIQAWTcgMT_story.html. 
194.  Kent P. Hymel et al., Derivation of a Clinical Prediction Rule for
Pediatric Abusive Head Trauma, 14 PEDIATRIC CRITICAL CARE MED. 210, 212 (2013). 
195.  Id. at 217.
196.  See id. at 212.
197.  See, e.g., Narang, supra note 49, at 529.
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should be apparent, however, that any exercise of clinical judgment is 
susceptible to error, even in contexts where there are clear and well-
defined diagnostic criteria (indeed medical misdiagnosis is a serious 
problem in all areas of medicine).198 But the typical testimony offered 
by a child abuse physician is to assert a diagnosis “to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty,” without acknowledging any likelihood of 
an alternative or any probability of misdiagnosis. Child abuse 
physicians routinely claim that all other possibilities have been ruled 
out, or that nothing else but shaking or shaking with impact could have 
caused the child’s condition, or that a short fall could not have caused 
the injuries, or that a lucid interval was not possible, or the like.199 The 
SPR takes this all a step further, contending that such claims are non-
controversial, and that defense critics who point out the uncertainties 
and the alternative possibilities have no place in the legal proceedings in 
which abuse is alleged.200 
Indeed, one of the nation’s most visible and outspoken SBS/AHT 
prosecutors, Brian Holmgren, has urged that in SBS/AHT cases the 
ethical expert should claim definiteness even when the medical evidence 
in the expert’s opinion merely makes abuse very likely.201 Holmgren 
acknowledges, for example, that accidental short falls can sometimes—
albeit rarely—produce the same constellation of signs and injuries (or 
death) that are used to diagnose SBS/AHT. Nonetheless, he argues that, 
198. Medical experts recognize that, across all types of medical diagnoses,
“[c]ases of delayed, missed, and incorrect diagnoses are common, with an incidence in 
the range of [ten to twenty percent],” and error is higher in clinical diagnoses and 
lower with respect to diagnostic tests. Mark L. Graber et al., Bringing Diagnosis into 
the Quality and Safety Equations, 308 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1211, 1211 (2012); “[I]t is 
clear that an extensive and ever-growing literature confirms that diagnostic errors exist 
at nontrivial and sometimes alarming rates. These studies span every specialty and 
virtually every dimension of both inpatient and outpatient care.” Eta S. Berner & Mark 
L. Graber, Overconfidence as a Cause of Diagnostic Error in Medicine, 121 AM. J.
MED. S2, S6 (2008).
Moreover, these errors are not just failures to recognize and diagnose diseases or 
conditions; the errors are often those of over-diagnosis. In another pediatric realm, for 
example, pediatricians misdiagnose ear infections an average of fifty percent of the 
time, and most of the errors are of over-diagnosis (Type 1 errors) and over-prescription 
of antibiotics. Michael E. Pichichero & Michael D. Poole, Assessing Diagnostic 
Accuracy and Tympanocentesis Skills in the Management of Otitis Media, 155 
ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 1137, 1137, 1139 (2001); Richard M. 
Rosenfeld, Diagnostic Certainty for Acute Otitis Media, 64 INT’L J. PEDIATRIC
OTORHINOLARYNGOLOGY 89, 89 (2002); Michael E. Pichichero & Michael D. Poole, 
Comparison of Performance by Otolaryngologists, Pediatricians, and General 
Practitioners on an Otoendoscopic Diagnostic Video Examination, 69 INT’L J.
PEDIATRIC OTORHINOLARYNGOLOGY 361, 361, 365 (2005).  
199. Findley et al., supra note 3, at 214.
200. Choudhary et al., supra note 10, at 1049.
201.  Brian K. Holmgren, Ethical Issues in Forensic Testimony Involving
Abusive Head Trauma, 3 ACAD. FORENSIC PATHOLOGY 317, 319 (2013). 
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“if the question [to the expert] is phrased ‘to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty, [did] a short fall . . . cause the death of this child?’ . 
. . then the correct answer should be ‘no’ given the extreme 
unlikelihood of such an event.”202 
But of course, the answer should not be “no.” The answer should 
be, “I cannot say with certainty based upon the medical evidence 
available to me.  Short falls can cause such medical signs and injuries 
(or death), but it is rare. Nothing in the medical research or my 
findings in this case permits me to say that this case is not one of those 
rare ones.” And if a caregiver or witness provides a history of a short 
fall, the answer should be, “Nothing in the medical research or my 
findings in this case permits me to say that this history is false, or that 
this short fall could not be the cause of this child’s condition,” or “the 
medical evidence in this case is consistent with the fall described by the 
caregiver.” As the American Medical Association has cautioned, “it is 
ethically important for a physician expert witness to make clear . . . 
that probabilities not be misrepresented as definitive conclusions.”203 
The SPR, like Holmgren, seeks to claim an authoritativeness and 
certainty that the science does not permit, at least not in a legal context. 
2. ADMISSIBILITY ISSUES ARISING FROM THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE
“DIAGNOSIS” 
All of this means, of course, that not everything the SPR seems to 
claim to be within the expertise of the “diagnosing” physician is 
admissible under the Rules of Evidence. Whether a jurisdiction follows 
Frye’s “general acceptance” standard or Daubert’s “reliable science” 
standard, limitations, not recognized by the SPR, will apply. 
First, because claims of definitiveness or specific odds-based 
claims are scientifically unsupportable, under Daubert they exceed the 
scope of permissible testimony. Likewise, under Frye, because all 
knowledgeable physicians recognize that “diagnosing” abuse involves 
clinical judgment, and is not testable by any definitive test, any claim to 
definitiveness of the “diagnosis” cannot be said to achieve “general 
acceptance” in the medical community. 
Certainly, physicians can identify observed medical conditions, 
such as subdural or subarachnoid hematomas, retinal hemorrhages, 
cerebral edema, fractures, or the like. And as the ALI observes, if 
there is a reliable basis in the research physicians may testify about 
whether, in the physician’s opinion, such findings are consistent with 
various possibilities presented, including “whether the injuries are 
202.  Id. (emphasis in original).
203.  Michael S. Goldrich, American Medical Association, Report of the
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA Report 12 - A-04), at 3 (2004). 
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consistent with blunt force trauma inflicted by the parent.”204 But the 
physician may not rule out innocent causes simply because they are 
rare, or because the mechanism of injury is not well understood. And 
the physician may not opine about what particular actions a third-party 
took to cause those injuries, or whether any trauma was inflicted 
knowingly or intentionally rather than accidentally. In other words, the 
physician may not “diagnose” abuse in the courtroom. 
To be sure, to date most courts, without a lot of thought or 
analysis, have admitted SBS/AHT expert testimony (for both sides) 
without limitation (in this regard, the courts have not improved on their 
utter failure to regulate adequately the admissibility of almost all other 
unscientific and unreliable forensic evidence in criminal cases).205 But 
the medical research challenging many aspects of the SBS/AHT 
hypothesis is growing, the ALI statement is new, and defense lawyers 
and courts are just now beginning to become sophisticated enough in 
this complicated area of medicine and law to understand the appropriate 
limitations that should apply. The opportunities for getting it right are, 
in short, growing. 
A very recent decision from a court in Florida further illustrates 
one way that a more thoughtful admissibility inquiry might play out. In 
State v. Kent Johnson,206 after an evidentiary hearing on the 
admissibility of the state’s experts’ SBS/AHT testimony, the court 
excluded those parts of the experts’ proposed testimony that would have 
gone beyond medical diagnosis of the child’s medical conditions and 
wandered into much less well-grounded medical hypotheses that intrude 
on legal judgments.207 The court ruled: 
The Court finds that the term “Shaken Baby Syndrome” and 
related terms set forth above [including also “shaking,” 
204.  RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 3.20 (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 1, 2018). 
205.  See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal
Proceedings: Questions Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1125 
(2003); Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and 
Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107 (2005); D. Michael 
Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left 
on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 143–49 (2000); Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The 
Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal 
Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 342 (2002); Randolph N. Jonakait, 
The Meaning of Daubert and What That Means for Forensic Science, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2103, 2117 (1994).   
206. Order Granting Defendant’s Amended Motion In Limine to Exclude Any
Testimony Regarding Shaken Baby Syndrome or in the Alternative Request for a Frye 
Hearing, State v. Johnson, Case No. 15-CF-018630-A, (Fla. Hillsborough Ct., Oct. 
17, 2018). 
207.  Id. at 1–2.
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“shaken baby,” “rotation acceleration,” or “acceleration-
deceleration force”] to be supported by insufficient scientific 
data and evidence. The Court finds that after reviewing the 
motion, argument, and testimony from various witnesses, 
there is ample evidence to demonstrate that the terminology 
does not adequately describe the range of potential causes of 
head injuries. There is no established science to support 
“Shaken Baby Syndrome” as a valid diagnosis. Thus, 
Defendant’s motion is granted and the Court limits the use of 
the phrase “Shaken Baby Syndrome” and related phrases 
stated in this Order from being used in the course of 
Defendant’s trial.208 
It is too early yet to know if this decision will be appealed and, if 
so, whether it will stand up on appeal, or whether it will be followed by 
other courts. But it does at least reflect growing recognition of the legal 
problems with expert testimony in this field. 
Regardless, even if broadly framed admissibility challenges like 
this prove unavailing in other cases, at the very least some aspects of 
the traditional SBS/AHT dogma are now so thoroughly undermined that 
testimonial assertions related to them should not survive Daubert or 
Frye challenges. Those include assertions that at one time were 
ubiquitous, but now have been shown to be scientifically wrong or void 
of any scientific foundation, including assertions such as (but not 
limited to): 
• Short falls cannot kill or cause serious brain injury
(including the triad and related findings);
• The forces required to cause such injuries would have to
be so massive as to be recognizable to any observer as
likely to kill or seriously harm the child, equivalent to the
forces in a high-speed automobile crash or a multi-story
fall;
• Nothing could cause the various medical findings relied
upon to “diagnose” abuse except shaking, shaking with
impact, or inflicted blunt force trauma;
• Lucid intervals between the time of injury and collapse are
not possible in cases involving serious brain injury.
208.  Id. See also Clark v. State, No. 2017-KA-00411-COA, 2019 WL
5566234, ¶¶ 47–48 (detailing how a Mississippi appellate court decision issued just as 
this article was going to press holding that testimony “diagnosing” SBS was unreliable 
and “should therefore have been excluded,” because “[t]here was no proof that the 
medical science . . . reliably explained the biomechanical processes by which SBS or 
AHT develop. . . . [and because t]here was  . . . no proof that the medical science . . . 
reliably aided the jury in understanding the cause and timing of [the child’s] death.”). 
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B. Legal Implications of the Controversy
That the SBS/AHT “diagnosis” is controversial also has legal 
implications. In part, the controversy adds to the admissibility questions 
under Daubert or Frye discussed above. To the extent that both 
Daubert and Frye turn at least in part on “general acceptance,” the fact 
that so many propositions involved in diagnosing SBS/AHT in any 
given case are controversial means that the controversies raise doubts 
about admissibility. 
The controversy also has legal implications for the duties of 
defense counsel in representing individuals accused of child abuse. 
Because so many of the propositions underlying the SBS/AHT 
“diagnosis” in any given case are scientifically debatable, courts are 
increasingly recognizing that defense counsel fail to meet Sixth 
Amendment standards for effective assistance of counsel if they fail to 
obtain expert assistance from appropriate medical and/or other 
scientific experts, including from those who are critical of the 
hypothesis.209 
Similarly, the disputes impose obligations on trial courts to ensure 
that indigent defendants have the funds necessary to hire appropriate 
209. See, e.g., West Virginia Innocence Project Client Freed from Prison,
WVUTODAY (Aug. 16, 2018), https://wvutoday.wvu.edu/stories/2018/08/16/west-
virginia-innocence-project-client-freed-from-prison [https://perma.cc/TU8J-USUW]; 
Order Granting Post-Conviction Relief, Reversing Petitioner’s Judgment and Sentence, 
and Remanding to the District Court of Wagoner County for a New Trial, Brafford v. 
State, No. PC-2014-803 (Okla. Crim. App., Mar. 26, 2019) (on file with author); 
Maurice Possley, Krystal Voss, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Sept. 20, 2017), 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5198 
[https://perma.cc/5SEA-BQ37]; Commonwealth v. Millien, 50 N.E.3d 808, 814, 816–
18 (Mass. 2016); Commonwealth v. Epps, 53 N.E.3d 1247, 1255, 1258, 1263 (Mass. 
2016); People v. DiMambro, 897 N.W.2d 233 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016); People v. 
Ackley, 870 N.W.2d 858, 867 (Mich. 2015); State v. Pheils, No. WD-14-072, 2015 
WL 5306548 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015); Sissoko v. State, 182 A.3d 874, 876 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2018) (noting that initial conviction was overturned based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and then affirming conviction after retrial); Memorandum, 
Statement of Reasons, and Order Regarding Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, 
Dobson v. State, No. 20-K-09-9572 (Cir. Ct. Kent Cty., Apr. 7, 2014); Adam Armour, 
Judge Vacates Convicted Murderer’s Guilty Plea, ITAWAMBA CTY. TIMES (July 2, 
2014), https://www.djournal.com/itawamba/news/itawamba-county/judge-vacates-
convicted-murderer-s-guilty-plea/article_dea69b1f-bbd7-5d73-bd14-236634add1d7.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z48S-WPT6]; Joseph Shapiro, Judge Tosses Conviction of Texas Man 
Accused of Sexually Assaulting Infant, NPR (Jan. 26, 2012, 11:29 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/01/26/145901310/judge-tosses-conviction-
of-texas-man-accused-of-sexually-assaulting-infant [https://perma.cc/D8RN-DMD2]; 
Armando Castillo, AZ JUST. PROJECT (May 21, 2015), 
https://www.azjusticeproject.org/manifest-injustice-profiles/armando-castillo 
[https://perma.cc/45EG-3223]; State v. Schoonmaker, 176 P.3d 1105, 1116 (N.M. 
2008); State v. Hales, 152 P.3d 321 (Utah 2007); Ex Parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d 458 , 
469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 
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experts to assist them in these medical-science-dependent prosecutions. 
In this regard, courts are also recognizing that failure to appoint the 
necessary defense experts in these cases violates due process under the 
principles enunciated in Ake v. Oklahoma.210 
Finally, the controversy has implications for courts assessing post-
conviction challenges to prior SBS/AHT convictions based on claims of 
newly discovered evidence. As noted above, when a conviction is 
obtained on the basis of uncontroverted medical opinion evidence 
presenting SBS/AHT as settled science with no alternatives, the new 
research raising the various challenges that create the serious 
controversies today can be and is increasingly being used as the basis 
for granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.211 As 
numerous courts have now recognized, when a case is presented as 
based on settled science, and especially when that settled science 
constitutes the bulk of the prosecution’s case, new evidence that the 
science is not so certain requires a new trial at which a jury can fully 
consider the competing claims.212 
CONCLUSION 
In its “consensus statement,” the SPR tries to wave away the 
roiling controversy about the reliability of SBS/AHT “diagnoses” by 
declaring that there is, in fact, no genuine controversy and that, in any 
event, the question is purely one of medical diagnostics for which 
courts should defer to medical judgments. We have shown that SPR is 
wrong on both counts. There are very serious questions about the 
reliability of SBS/AHT “diagnoses,” and those questions cannot be 
papered over by bringing together a guild of true believers to publish a 
“consensus statement.” And the SBS/AHT “diagnosis” is inherently a 
legal judgment for which the courts must continue to play a gatekeeping 
role. 
210.  Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985). For examples of cases
reversing SBS/AHT convictions based on Ake violations, see Isham v. State, 161 So.3d 
1076 (Miss. 2015); Brown v. State, 152 So. 3d 1146, 1170 (Miss. 2014); State v. 
Gallaway, 2015 WL 4460992 (Del. 2015); McDonald v. State, 101 So.3d 914, 916 
(Fla. App. 2012). 
211.  See cases cited supra note 209.
212. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Findley & Risinger, supra note
64, at 1224–25. 
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APPENDIX 1 
October 27, 2017 
Via Email and Regular U.S. Mail 
Society for Pediatric Radiology 
1891 Preston White Drive 
Reston, VA 20191 
Re: “Consensus Statement on Abusive Head Trauma in Infants and 
Young Children” 
We are longstanding SPR members who have published, lectured 
and consulted on shaken baby syndrome/abusive head trauma 
(SBS/AHT) and related subjects. On October 17 we received via email 
a lengthy (50 page, 211 reference) paper titled Consensus Statement on 
Abusive Head Trauma in Infants and Young Children whose stated 
purpose is to provide guidance to the courts, the media and the public. 
While the SPR’s Child Abuse Imaging Committee led the effort to 
prepare the Statement, the authors include several child abuse 
pediatricians and a law professor who are leading advocates of the 
SBS/AHT hypothesis. The email invites comments, but imposed a 
deadline of October 27. This was the first we had heard about any of 
this. 
Because of the short timeframe for comment, which is limited to 
SPR members, our feedback is abbreviated. We provide these 
preliminary comments to meet the October 27 deadline, but ask for an 
opportunity to submit a more complete response. Should the SPR 
publish the Consensus Statement, we ask that the response be published 
with the Statement or shortly thereafter. We also recommend that 
comments be invited from other interested parties. 
Our concern is that as presently written, the Statement is likely to 
be misleading to the courts and others on the nature and extent of the 
SBS/AHT controversy. SBS/AHT refers to the hypothesis that shaking 
or abuse may be reliably inferred from various internal radiological or 
pathological findings, none of which are specific to trauma. The 
Consensus Statement characterizes the literature supporting the 
SBS/AHT hypothesis as based on medical science and the literature 
questioning the reliability of the inference or suggesting alternative 
causes as grounded in denialism of child abuse and a desire to improve 
defense outcomes for abusive caretakers. This is incorrect. We are 
familiar with the medical, scientific and legal literature that raises 
concerns about the quality of evidence supporting SBS/AHT beliefs and 
there is no denialism of child abuse within that literature. There is, 
however, considerable and growing concern about the reliability of the 
diagnostic criteria and an increasing interest in the differential diagnosis 
for the findings on which the diagnosis is based. 
The Controversy 
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The Consensus Statement suggests that there is no legitimate 
controversy on SBS/AHT. In recent years many courts have 
acknowledged the existence of a legitimate controversy on this subject. 
The controversy also exists within the medical, scientific and legal 
literature. In 2016, a report from the President’s Council of Advisors 
on Science and Technology on the scientific flaws in numerous areas of 
forensic science stated that SBS/AHT was a subject beyond the scope of 
the report, but is a matter that requires “urgent attention.” In October 
2016, a Swedish governmental agency published the results of a two 
year review of the evidence base for SBS that concluded that the 
traditional diagnostic criteria for SBS were unreliable and based on low 
or very low quality evidence, with the only support coming from two 
confession articles. Views that the Consensus Statement holds out as 
matters of general acceptance are also widely questioned in the fields of 
forensic pathology and biomechanics. 
The Diagnostic Criteria 
The Consensus Statement states that SBS/AHT is a “medical 
diagnosis” but does not mention that the diagnostic criteria have 
changed substantially over the past decades. Instead, the Statement 
seeks to inform judges, jurors, the media, and the public that the 
critiques of SBS/AHT proceed from the “deliberate 
mischaracterization” that SBS/AHT is diagnosed based on a “triad” of 
findings rather than a multidisciplinary medical and nonmedical 
investigation. However, the  triad findings (subdural hemorrhage, 
retinal hemorrhage and cerebral edema and/or encephalopathy) have 
had and continue to have enormous significance in diagnosing 
SBS/AHT. The child abuse literature is filled with references to the 
triad, or merely the presence of subdural and retinal hemorrhage in the 
absence of a history of major trauma, as being virtually diagnostic of 
SBS/AHT. It is therefore critical to evaluate the diagnostic value of 
these elements, individually and in combination, as well as to 
understand the range of alternative traumatic and non-traumatic 
conditions that result in these findings. When one does so, major 
concerns emerge. 
3. The Pathological Assumptions
The SBS hypothesis stemmed from assumptions that the cerebral
edema, subdural hemorrhage, and retinal hemorrhages found 
in children without external evidence of significant head trauma 
reflected traumatic diffuse axonal injury, ruptured bridging 
veins, and vitreoretinal hemorrhage, and that in nearly all 
instances repetitive violent shaking best explained these “shearing 
injuries.” We now know, however, that the cerebral 
edema typically reflects hypoxicischemic injury rather than 
DAI; that the scant or thin subdural hemorrhage common in these 
cases may reflect oozing from within the dura rather than torn 
bridging veins; and that retinal hemorrhages occur 
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in a wide range of traumatic and non-traumatic conditions. There is as 
yet no evidence to validate vitreoretinal traction as the source of retinal 
findings in children. Accordingly, viewing these findings as indicative 
of shaking is an increasingly dubious hypothesis. Any Consensus 
Statement should acknowledge the overlap in findings between 
accidental injuries, abusive injuries and natural causes. 
4. Short Falls
A common history in children presenting with subdural
hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage, and/or seizures or other neurologic 
defect is that the children sustained a short fall or similar accidental 
trauma. For years the prevailing guidance in the child abuse literature 
was that this history was necessarily false. The current evidence, which 
includes at least two videotaped and many witnessed short falls, now 
provides indisputable evidence that short falls in young children may 
cause all of these findings and, occasionally, death. Several court 
decisions have recognized the evolving understandings in this area. The 
prevailing view in forensic pathology is that a history of a short fall in 
the presence of an isolated impact injury cannot be rejected as a 
potential explanation for subdural hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage, 
brain injury or even death. 
5. The Quality of the SBS/AHT Evidence Base
The reliability of SBS/AHT diagnoses depends on the quality of
the evidence that has historically reported strong associations between 
the triad findings and SBS/AHT. It is now recognized that the 
SBS/AHT literature is based largely on studies that used circular and 
self-fulfilling methodology—e.g., subdural and retinal hemorrhages 
were used as primary diagnostic and classification criteria for 
SBS/AHT in studies that then reported an extremely high rate of such 
hemorrhages in SBS/AHT. This circular reasoning has been noted in 
meta-analyses, and a leading 2011 child abuse textbook further 
concluded that confessions were the evidence base for SBS. The recent 
Swedish Report similarly found that nearly the entire SBS evidence 
base is circular and unreliable. The two papers it classified as moderate 
quality were confession papers. The Consensus Statement ignores these 
evidentiary concerns and dismisses the Swedish Report in a few 
sentences, citing comments accusing its authors of unethical bias and of 
unreasonableness in refusing to accept the findings of child protection 
teams as sufficiently reliable for study classification purposes. The 
Statement does not refer to an additional paper published by the authors 
of the Swedish Report titled Is Accepting Circular Reasoning in Shaken 
Baby Studies Bad Science or Misconduct?, in which the authors 
explained that using “the classification used by child protection teams 
as the gold standard for classifying study cases and controls entails a 
high risk of bias and carries a risk that false positive cases are presented 
as true-positive cases.” The citation of responses to the Report, 
1266 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
including by one of the Statement’s authors, while omitting replies from 
the Report’s authors is inappropriate for a “Consensus Statement.” 
6. Natural Causes
As faith in the diagnostic specificity of the triad has waned,
attention has turned to alternative explanations for the findings 
previously viewed as diagnostic or even pathognomonic of shaking. 
Many controversies and unknowns exist concerning the diagnostic 
criteria for alternative diagnoses; many of them are rare, have been 
incompletely studied, and/or have been underdiagnosed because of 
mistaken beliefs that the triad findings reflected SBS/AHT. The 
guidance offered by the Consensus Statement on a handful of natural 
causes that produce similar findings is misleading. We offer immediate 
feedback about the Statement’s criticisms of two of these diagnoses. 
Cerebral Venous Thrombosis (CVT). The Consensus Statement 
asserts that CVT is not associated with subdural hemorrhage and, 
further, that findings attributed to CVT actually reflect intracranial 
venous injury caused by abuse. Outside the child abuse literature there 
is existing and growing awareness that CVT often produces intracranial 
hemorrhage, that it is rarely associated with trauma, and that it may be 
difficult on imaging to distinguish between thrombosed veins and extra-
axial hemorrhage. While venous thrombosis may also occur in head 
injury, there is a general understanding that CVT has been under-
diagnosed in the pediatric population and reason to believe that it has 
been misdiagnosed as SBS/AHT in the courtroom. 
BESS. Benign enlargement (or expansion) of the subarachnoid 
spaces (“BESS”) is a diagnosis known by several names. The 
Consensus Statement advises that BESS was “initially thought to 
predispose to SDH with minimal trauma,” but that recent reviews 
reveal that less than 6% of such patients develop subdural collections. 
The Statement urges caution about studies indicating a higher 
prevalence because they may have lacked adequate assessment for 
abuse. This guidance is not, however, a consensus position. A 2011 
review summarized: “Several studies have shown an increased risk of 
subdural hematomas in children with external hydrocephalus after 
minimal or no known head trauma.” The recent studies the Statement 
claims are more reliable should be examined to ensure that this is not a 
function of selection bias or circularity—e.g., the exclusion of cases 
diagnosed as SBS/AHT on the basis of the child having subdural or 
retinal hemorrhage, seizures, or a history of minor trauma. 
*** 
As a matter of scientific vigor, continuing review of the strength of 
the evidence base for the SBS/AHT diagnosis is mandatory. In less than 
two decades we have seen a shift from dogmatic medical claims that the 
triad is diagnostic or even pathognomonic of shaking to the claim set 
forth in the proposed Consensus Statement that the triad is a “legal 
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argument and not a medically valid term.” As the discussion continues, 
we must remember that these are not abstract concepts but rather are 
diagnoses that are used to remove children from their homes and to 
imprison their parents and caretakers. In this context, attempting to 
demean or mischaracterize countering viewpoints reflects advocacy, not 
science. Should the SPR still intend to issue the Consensus Statement, 
we ask for the opportunity to publish a fuller response. We believe such 
a response can be completed within 30 days. 
Sincerely, 
Patrick D. Barnes, M.D. 
Julie A. Mack, M.D. 
